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Abstract
This paper analyzes how outsiders, such as bidders or activist investors, overcome the lack of coor-
dination and information among dispersed shareholders. We identify the two basic means to achieve this
goal. First, the outsider must relinquish private benefits in a manner that is informative about security
benefits. We show under which conditions this is feasible and which acquisition strategies used in practice
meet these conditions. Second, the outsider can alternatively use derivatives to drive a wedge between
her voting power and her economic interest in the firm. Such unbundling of ownership and control, while
typically considered a source of corporate governance problems, is an efficient response to the frictions
dispersed ownership causes for control contestability. We also show that unbundling comes with costs and
benefits for the bidder’s incentives to improve firm value.
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1 Introduction
Dispersed shareholders do not coordinate their actions and individually have too little incentive to become
informed and monitor managerial decisions. Such passivism is the origin of two fundamental corporate
governance problems. Inside the firm, it allows “insiders” to extract private benefits at the expense of small
shareholders, thus making the reduction of these benefits synonymous to good governance. Since Jensen and
Meckling (1976), a commonly accepted principle for mitigating this problem is to tie control to ownership.
Using this argument, the standard contractarian theory of corporate law supports allocating voting rights to
shareholders in proportion to cash flow rights (one share-one vote) as economically efficient.1 The violation
of this principle is the reason why devices such as dual-class shares and pyramidal ownership structures are
generally met with skepticism.
Outside the firm, the lack of coordination and information makes dispersed shareholders reluctant to
sell their shares, which makes it difficult for “outsiders” who can enhance firm value, such as acquirers or
activists, to gain control or influence over the firm. In this case, good governance aims to facilitate control
transfers, and this may require that outsiders derive private benefits from control. Conceptually, this problem
is manifested most purely in tender offers. Indeed, this is the context in which it has first been recognized:
Grossman and Hart (1980) show that each individual shareholder is reluctant to tender because she wants
to free-ride on the value improvement. Grossman and Hart (1981) show that they may not tender when the
bidder might gain purely from being better informed.
The general insight to be drawn from the present paper is that the “outside” governance problem, despite
having the same origin, calls for solutions that are the opposite of those to the “inside” problem. We analyze
an outsider aiming to acquire control from shareholders that lack coordination and information and identify
the two basic principles that shape her optimal strategies: First, to overcome the interaction of asymmetric
information and collective action problem, the outsider must relinquish private benefits. But the reduction
in her private benefits runs counter to good governance because it can frustrate efficient transfers of control.
Second, this inefficiency is mitigated if the outsider can unbundle ownership and control. In fact, the optimal
unbundling strategy implements the symmetric information outcome by fully preserving private benefits.
Inverting this statement, this means that tying control to ownership to reduce private benefits exacerbates
the governance problem dispersed ownership creates vis-à-vis outsiders – in direct contradiction to standard
contractarian arguments.
Furthermore, by identifying these principles, we provide a prism through which one can “see” the com-
mon logic that underlies seemingly diverse strategies outsiders use to gain influence over firms in practice.
To demonstrate this, we map existing models in the literature on tender offers with a privately informed bid-
der (Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990; Chowdry and Jegadeesh, 1994) into our generic framework and show that
the proposed solutions all conform to the principle of relinquishing private benefits. Going further, we use
the principle to identify novel signaling devices such as takeover leverage. The principles also clarify what
1Easterbrook and Fischel (1983, 1991)’s article and book are the classic corporate law references for this argument.
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does not work. For example, in contrast to results in the merger literature, cash-equity offers lack signaling
power because they conform to neither of the two principles. The same principles apply when we adapt our
framework to the situation of an activist investor who wants to gain influence on a corporate decision through
open-market trades. In particular, the activist’s optimal strategy is to acquire common shares in combination
with derivatives that partly offset her equity interest in the firm, a strategy referred to in practice as empty
voting. Empty voting – or more broadly, any activist strategy of exercising influence in excess of ownership
(i.e., “unbundling”) – is thus an implementation of our second general principle for overcoming the lack of
coordination and information in public equity markets with dispersed owners.
We begin analyzing the governance problem between dispersed shareholders and outsiders in Section 2
with a simple tender offer game in which the bidder has exogenous private benefits and private information
about the post-takeover value improvement. As regards separating equilibria in this setting, an impossibility
result obtains: The bidder cannot reveal her type through the offer terms. (Pooling equilibria exist and are
discussed in Section 3.2.) The interaction between asymmetric information and collective action problem is
key to this result. Truthful revelation requires that high-valued bidders earn information rents. However, the
dispersed shareholders’ free-rider behavior precludes that these rents stem from gains in security benefits –
and the private benefits are exogenous.
In Section 3, we introduce the possibility for the bidder to relinquish (part of) her private benefits. Two
conditions must be satisfied for private benefits to be instrumental in signaling: The bidder must be able
to commit to relinquish specific amounts of private benefits at the time of the offer, and doing so must be
informative about the post-takeover security benefits. If these conditions are met, the bidder can reveal
a low(er) post-takeover value by relinquishing (more) private benefits, and thereby succeed at a low(er)
price. As we show, the signaling instruments proposed in the literature, toeholds and probabilistic tendering,
work precisely because they operate on this principle. More generally, the principle allows us to identify
signaling devices simply by relabeling variables of a specific tender offer game to match those in our generic
framework. We explore three other sources of private benefits – diversion, debt, and bidder assets – and
argue that of these only debt meets the conditions for a viable signal.
Relinquishing private benefits redistributes rents from the bidder to target shareholders. In a separating
equilibrium, lower-valued bidders must give up relatively more private benefits. As a result, the equilibrium
outcome typically exhibits inefficiency at the “bottom”: Only bidders above a cut-off type make a bid, and a
higher cut-off type amounts to less takeover activity. In pooling equilibria, the uniform price transfers rents
from low-valued to high-valued bidders, since the former pay a premium but the latter buy at a discount. This
redistribution among types can make a takeover unprofitable for some low-valued bidders. Since the price in
a pooling equilibrium depends on the distribution of bidder types, so does the extent of the inefficiency. In
a separating equilibrium, tender offers and inefficiency are solely determined by the incentive compatibility
constraints, but not the type probabilities. Changes in the bidder type distribution can hence make pooling
outcomes more or less efficient than separating ones, which precludes a general ranking of the two types of
equilibria in terms of efficiency. By contrast, there is a clear-cut result regarding robustness: Only separating
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equilibria survive the intuitive criterion.
It has been shown that the target firm’s security-voting structure, such as dual-class shares or majority
rules, affects the efficiency of pooling outcomes; though, the direction of the effect is ambiguous (At et al.,
2011; Marquez and Yilmaz, 2012). We extend these results in Section 4. We first show that in the separating
equilibria of Section 3.1 allowing control with less ownership unambiguously improves efficiency because
the bidder can retain more private benefits. We then explore how the outcome changes if the bidder rather
than the target firm can separate cash flow and voting rights by extending the contract space to securities other
than cash and equity. As it turns out, the bidder can use call options to reveal her type without relinquishing
any private benefits, thereby implementing the symmetric information outcome. By writing call options, the
bidder assumes a negative financial interest in the firm that partly offsets the equity interest she has through
voting shares. As a result, she acquires votes in excess of cash flow rights. Such unbundling remains optimal
when we adapt our model to a setting with an activist investor who wants to buy shares from an uninformed
market-maker to sway an upcoming shareholder vote.
Section 5 studies an extension in which the bidder exerts post-takeover effort to improve firm value.
Introducing moral hazard to the framework does not undermine the optimality of using derivatives to help
shareholders correctly infer the security benefits. Conditional on restoring symmetric information, the bidder
then maximizes net private benefits rather than the value of her post-takeover block due to the shareholders’
free-rider behavior (Burkart et al., 1998). In fact, she can implement the requisite effort level independent
of the equity block she acquires through the same derivatives she uses to prevent shareholders from over-
estimating the post-takeover security benefits. In particular, writing call options “caps” her incentives to
increase security benefits once she is in control.
The impact of unbundling on equilibrium effort is in general ambiguous. On one hand, unbundling lets
the bidder seize control with less ownership, which weakens her incentives. On the other hand, she need no
longer forgo private benefits to reveal her type, which strengthens her incentives. When the negative effect
dominates, unbundling creates a tension between outside governance and inside governance. For example,
this tension arises whenever toeholds are the source of private gains. In this case a control-seeking outsider
optimally decouples control from ownership to the extent that her incentives as a controlling insider decrease
from a level commensurate with a majority stake to a level commensurate with the maximum toehold size.
Where unbundling is feasible, this raises the question what an outsider for whom equity gains are the source
of profit stands to win by wrestling a majority stake from the hands of free-riding shareholders relative to
engaging in activism with the largest minority stake she can secretly accumulate in the open market.
In Section 6, we interpret our framework to draw out parallels and differences between tender offers
and investor activism as alternative methods to overcome the outside governance problem. In addition, we
discuss novel predictions of our analysis for the use of equity as payment in takeovers, the impact of empty
voting on firm value, and the relationship between takeover leverage and takeover returns.
Grossman and Hart (1981) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the first analyses of asymmetric information
in tender offers, focus exclusively on pooling equilibria. Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) and Chowdry and
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Jegadeesh (1994) are the only papers that construct separating equilibria in a tender offer game.2 In Section
3, we derive the general “relinquishing-private-benefits” mechanism that these equilibria are examples of.
We provide the first general analysis of the problem that a lack of information and coordination among target
shareholders poses for outside bidders, which not only contextualizes existing results but provides a deeper
insight into the nature of the problem and the solutions to overcome it. Our analysis in Section 5 of a setting
that combines asymmetric information, the free-rider problem, and moral hazard is to our knowledge novel,
though the interaction between the latter two frictions has been studied in Burkart et al. (1998).
Several papers show that cash-equity offers can overcome asymmetric information problems in mergers
(Hansen, 1987; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990; Eckbo et al., 1990; Brusco et al., 2007; and Ferreira et al.,
2007). These papers abstract from the free-rider problem, which plays a crucial role in undermining the sig-
naling role of cash-equity offers in our setting.3 Convertible securities as a means to overcome information
asymmetries have been studied by Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2011) in the context of external financing.
Hu and Black (2006, 2008) were first to draw attention to empty voting and the possibility that it may be
abused to pass poor corporate decisions.4 Brav and Matthews (2011) formalize this concern and show how
active investors may use empty voting to reduce firm value at the expense of noise traders in the secondary
market. We abstract from noise trading and show that empty voting emerges endogenously as the activist’s
optimal response to free-riding by uninformed but rational investors (as manifested in the price impact) in the
secondary market and enhances firm value. Two papers extend Grossman and Hart (1988)’s and Harris and
Raviv (1988)’s insights on separating cash flow and voting rights in bidding contests to vote buying: Dekel
and Wolinsky (2012) show that it can be privately optimal for the target shareholders to sell their votes to the
less efficient bidder; Neeman and Orosel (2006) focus on elections (as opposed to asset purchases) and show
that an election is certain to be “bought” by the efficient bidder only if the willingness-to-pay for winning
is positively related with the ability to create value. Last, Esö et al. (2014) also consider elections and study
vote trading in the presence of informed, uninformed, and preference-biased voters (shareholders).
2 Free-riding undermines signaling
A widely held firm faces a single potential acquirer, henceforth the bidder. If the bidder gains control, she
can generate security benefits X . The bidder learns her type prior to making the tender offer, whereas target
shareholders merely know that X is distributed on X = [0,X ] according to the continuously differentiable
density function g(X). The cumulative distribution function is denoted by G(X). If the takeover does not
materialise, the incumbent manager remains in control. The incumbent generates security benefits X I that are
2Marquez and Yilmaz (2008) reverse the information asymmetry and study a tender offer game in which target shareholders receive
noisy private signals so that the bidder faces a winner’s curse problem, as opposed to a signaling problem.
3Rather than reducing the information gap between bidder and target shareholders, signaling can also serve the purpose of deterring
potential rivals, as in Fishman (1988, 1989), Bhattacharya (1990), and Liu (2008).
4Kalay and Pant (2009) argue that dispersed target shareholders can extract a higher price by assuming derivative positions prior to
a pending bidding contest. This is different from empty voting, which is a strategy pursued by an activist who wants to gain control.
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known to all shareholders and normalised to zero. Thus, we restrict attention to the case of value-improving
bids.
In addition, control confers exogenous private benefits Φ(X)> 0 on bidder type X . The private benefits
are known only to the bidder and non-transferable.
Since the firm has a one share–one vote structure, a successful tender offer must attract at least 50 percent
of the firm’s shares. The tender offer is conditional, and therefore becomes void if less than 50 percent of the
shares are tendered. In addition, the bidder can restrict the offer to a fraction r ∈ [0.5,1] of the shares. For
simplicity, we assume that there are no takeover costs. Hence, the benchmark (full information) outcome is
that all takeovers succeed.
The timing of the model is as follows. In stage 0, the bidder learns her type X . In stage 1, she then
decides whether to make a take-it-or-leave-it, conditional restricted tender offer in cash (alternative means
of payment will be considered later). If the bidder does not make a bid, the game moves immediately to
stage 3. Otherwise, she offers to purchase a fraction r of the outstanding shares at a price rP.
In stage 2, the target shareholders non-cooperatively decide whether to tender their shares. Shareholders
are homogeneous and atomistic.5 In stage 3, the incumbent manager remains in control if the fraction of
tendered shares β is less than 50 percent. Otherwise, the bidder gains control, extracts private benefits,
and pays βP unless the offer is oversubscribed, in which case she pays rP, and tendering shareholders are
randomly rationed.
There are two sources of frictions in this model: asymmetric information and the collective action problem.
Both of them are crucial in the sense that neither of them alone creates any inefficiency. If target shareholders
could observe the bidder’s type, they would accept the offer whenever the price at least matches the security
benefits under the bidder. The bidder would succeed and appropriate all her private benefits. Thus, the
outcome would be efficient despite the collective action problem.
If target shareholders could coordinate their tendering decisions, they would accept the offer whenever
the price at least matches the security benefits under the incumbent manager. The bidder would succeed and
appropriate the entire value improvement from the takeover. Also, note that the tender offer game, if the bid
price exceeds the security benefits under the incumbent, is de facto one of private contributions to a public
good under complete information. As known from implementation theory, a central authority could thus
implement the efficient outcome, in the case of tender offers simply by requiring unanimous participation.6
In short, absent the coordination problem, the outcome is efficient despite the information asymmetry.
However, we assume that shareholders are atomistic, non-cooperative, and must participate voluntarily,
5As in other tender offer models exploring the free-rider problem, we assume that the mass of outstanding shares is dispersed among
an infinite number of shareholders whose individual holdings are both equal and indivisible. When either of these assumption is relaxed,
Grossman and Hart’s (1980) result that all the gains in security benefits go to the target shareholders becomes diluted (Holmström and
Nalebuff, 1992).
6Given P > X , conditioning success on full participation does not eliminate failure as a Nash equilibrium but turns it into one
requiring the play of weakly dominated strategies. It is then non-robust to equilibrium refinements (cf., e.g., Bagnoli and Lipman,
1989).
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and that a successful tender offer requires only 50 percent of the shares. In this case, each shareholder
tenders only if the offered price at least matches the expected security benefits. Since shareholders condition
their expectations on the offer terms (r,P), a successful tender offer must satisfy the free-rider condition
P≥ E(X |r,P). Now the bidder’s private information matters, as the shareholders try to infer it from the offer
terms.
We assume that shareholders — after observing a bid price P and updating their beliefs — tender unless
the price is strictly lower than the expected post-takeover security benefits. This eliminates failure as an
equilibrium outcome when the free-rider condition is strictly satisfied.7 When the bid price exactly equals
the expected post-takeover share value, the target shareholders are strictly indifferent between tendering
and retaining their shares. That is, they are indifferent between these actions irrespective of their beliefs
about the takeover outcome, so that the weak dominance criterion does not pin down a tendering strategy.
The prevalent way of resolving the indeterminacy when P = E(X |r,P ) is to assume that each shareholder
tenders in this case, and hence the bid succeeds with certainty.8 Alternatively, one can assume that strictly
indifferent shareholders randomise, and that this leads to a probabilistic outcome.9 Subsequently, we focus
on deterministic outcomes, except in Section 3.1.5, which considers probabilistic outcomes.
Under the assumption that each shareholder tenders in case she is strictly indifferent, all shares (β = 1) are
tendered in a successful takeover. Accordingly, a successful restricted bid is oversubscribed, and the bidder
randomly selects the fraction r among all shareholders whose shares are purchased. The remaining 1− r
shareholders cannot sell and become minority shareholders.
As shown in Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Perfect Bayesian equilibria with a single pooling offer exist
when bidders have exogenously given private benefits. We now show that no other equilibria exist in this
setting and postpone the discussion of pooling equilibria to Section 3.2.
The bidder’s expected profit from a bid (r,P) is
Π(r,P) = q(r,P) [Φ+ r (X−P)] ,
where q(r,P) denotes the success probability, which is equal to 1 for P ≥ E(X |r,P ), and 0 otherwise. In
a separating equilibrium, the offer terms must be distinct across types that make a (successful) bid. This
requires that each equilibrium offer satisfies the free-rider condition, P(X) ≥ X , and the bidder’s incentive
7Given a conditional bid, a shareholder who believes the bid will fail is indifferent between tendering and retaining. Imposing
this belief on all shareholders and breaking the indifference in favour of retaining supports failure as an equilibrium, irrespective of the
offered price (Burkart et al., 2006). To avoid the co-existence of success and failure as equilibrium outcomes, it is typically assumed that
shareholders tender their shares when they are indifferent (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Contrary to our assumption, this precludes
failure as the equilibrium outcome for a conditional bid, and hence the existence of an equilibrium when the free-rider condition is
violated.
8A common motivation for this approach is that the bidder could sway the shareholders by raising the price infinitesimally. Although
this argument holds under full information, it does not apply in the asymmetric information setting, as even small price increases affect
shareholders’ expectations about the post-takeover security benefits.
9Judd (1985) shows that a continuum of independent and identically distributed variables can generate a stochastic aggregate out-
come.
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compatibility constraint
Φ+ r (X) [X−P(X)]≥Φ+ rˆ(X− Pˆ)
for all rˆ ∈ [0.5,1] and Pˆ ∈ R where (rˆ, Pˆ) denotes a deviation offer.
Proposition 1. In deterministic tender offer games with exogenous private benefits, no separating equilib-
rium exists.
The proof for the inexistence of signaling equilibria is straightforward: Given that P(X)≥ X , a truthful
bidder at best breaks even on the purchased shares, and her expected profit cannot exceed Φ(X). However,
each type offering her actual security benefits cannot be an equilibrium outcome. If a type x were to succeed
at a purchase price r(x)x, any type X > x would mimic type x to acquire shares at a price below their true
value X . This also holds if each type were to choose a different bid restriction r(·). Type X’s profits are
higher when buying r(x) shares at a discount compared to buying r(X) shares at their fair price, whether
r(x) is smaller or larger than r(X). These arguments eliminate P(X) = X combined either with a common r
or a type-contingent r(·) as possible equilibria. They also rule out outcomes in which some types offer more
than their true security benefits but less than the highest-valued type’s security benefits. Successful offers
with P(x) ∈ (x,X) would be mimicked by bidders of type X > P(x). Thus, a bidder can credibly signal her
type only by offering a sufficiently large premium such that P≥ X .
Revealing her type with an offer P ≥ X is, however, not an attractive option for the bidder. She can
instead make a bid P = X and restrict it to r = 0.5, the minimum fraction required to gain control. The
less costly offer (0.5,X) succeeds, since it satisfies the free-rider condition for all types (and any possible
shareholder beliefs).
Even though the single-crossing condition holds, separation fails because of the free-rider problem.10
The crucial role of the free-rider behaviour in eliminating separating equilibria can be explained in two
ways. From the perspective of lower-valued types, the free-rider condition eliminates the possibility of
producing a costly signal. Given that target shareholders extract all the gains in security benefits, the bidder
cannot surrender (part of) these gains to signal her type. From the perspective of higher-valued types, the
free-rider condition wipes out information rents. A bidder who at best breaks even on truthfully purchased
shares always wants to mimic a lower-valued type.11
The inexistence result holds irrespective of whether private benefits are constant or an arbitrary — pos-
sibly type-contingent, stochastic — function of the bidder type. Indeed, the constraints in the bidder’s max-
imisation problem are not affected by the non-transferable private benefits. They cancel out in the incentive
compatibility constraint and are not part of the free-rider condition.
Also, note that letting bidders choose the fraction of shares that they acquire does not allow them to
signal their type. The bid restriction merely limits the fraction of shares the bidder purchases for cash. This
10For each fixed (r,P), − ∂Π/∂ r∂Π/∂P is strictly monotone in X .
11Proposition 1 mirrors the result in Nachman and Noe (1994) that competitive pricing among security issuers eliminates separating
equilibria. The free-rider condition is our analogue to their competitive pricing assumption.
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makes restricted bids in this setting equivalent to bids in which target shareholders are in part compensated
through equity. Indeed, it is immaterial whether the bidder makes a partial bid for cash only or acquires all
shares in exchange for some cash and 1− r shares in the target firm under her control. Moreover, control
requires that the partial bid be for at least half the shares or that the equity component not exceed the cash
component in the cash-equity offer. By virtue of this equivalence, any separating equilibrium in cash-equity
offers would also have to exist in restricted cash-only offers.
Corollary 1. Introducing cash-equity offers into deterministic tender offer games with exogenous private
benefits does not make separating equilibria feasible.
Proposition 1 contrasts with results from bilateral merger models where cash-equity offers can reveal the
bidder’s type (Hansen, 1987; Berkovitch and Naranayan, 1990; Eckbo et al., 1990). Our basic framework
differs in two key respects. First, target shareholders have no private information and face, instead, a col-
lective action problem; that is, they are unable to coordinate their individual tendering decisions.12 Second,
the takeover is not undertaken to combine assets from two firms but to replace the incumbent managers. We
explore the role of bidder assets later in the paper (Sections 3.1.4 and 3.4).
3 Informative exclusion
Since dispersed shareholders never tender unless they are offered at least the full post-takeover security
benefits, relinquishing private benefits remains the only means for the bidder to reveal her type. To explore
this possibility, we modify the model: Instead of Φ(X) being non-transferable, the bidder can now choose
which fraction 1−α of the private benefits to relinquish. The foregone private benefits may or may not
increase the post-takeover security benefits, depending on how the bidder chooses to relinquish the private
benefits. To cover both cases, we denote the actual post-takeover security benefits with K(α,X), and refer
to X as the baseline security benefits, that is, the security benefits when the bidder retains all private benefits.
The bidder’s payoff from a successful takeover can then be written as
Π(r,α,P;X) = αΦ(X)+ r[K(α,X)−P]. (1)
We first establish the existence of separating equilibria and then show how well-known variants of the
tender offer game map into the present framework. Thereafter, we characterize pooling equilibria and discuss
efficiency and robustness across both types of equilibria. A discussion of two-dimensional asymmetric
information concludes the section.
12In merger models, the shareholders’ reservation price is typically the stand-alone value of the target firm and, if anything, private
information of the shareholders, not of the bidder.
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3.1 Separating equilibria
If a separating equilibrium exists, it can be implemented as a direct (truth-telling) mechanism. Let Xˆ denote
a bidder’s self-reported type. The bidder’s problem can then be formulated as
maxXˆ Π(Xˆ ;X) = α(Xˆ)Φ(X)+ r(Xˆ)[K(Xˆ ;X)−P(Xˆ)],
subject to (a) r(Xˆ) ∈ [0.5,1]
(b) α(Xˆ) ∈ [0,1]
(c) P(Xˆ)≥ E[K(Xˆ ;X)]
(2)
for all Xˆ ∈X , where (c) is the free-rider condition. With respect to K, we distinguish two cases. In one
case, relinquishing private benefits increases the actual security benefits to X + [1−α(Xˆ)]Φ. In the other
case, the foregone private benefits do not accrue to the target shareholders, and the actual security benefits
are therefore equal to the baseline security benefits X . We can thus define K(Xˆ ;X) = X + k[1−α(Xˆ)]Φ(X)
with k = 1 in one case and k = 0 in the other.
Under a separating offer schedule {r(·),α(·),P(·)}, the solution to this problem and hence to its first-
order condition
r(Xˆ)P′(Xˆ)+ r′(Xˆ)P(Xˆ) = α ′(Xˆ)Φ(X)+ r′(Xˆ)K(Xˆ ;X)+ r(Xˆ)K′(Xˆ ;X) (3)
must be Xˆ = X for all X ∈X . This and the free-rider condition (c) determine a relationship between α(·)
and P(·).
Proposition 2. In tender offer games where bidders can commit to relinquish any fraction of private benefits,
a separating equilibrium exists if Φ(·) is a non-decreasing function. All types above the cut-off type XcS ∈
[0,X) make a bid, and higher types choose to relinquish less private benefits. The bid restriction is a
redundant signal.
Incentive compatibility requires that higher-valued bidders offer higher prices and retain a larger fraction
of the private benefits. Bidders do not mimic lower-valued types because the gains from paying the lower
price are offset by the loss in private benefits. Conversely, bidders refrain from mimicking higher-valued
types because the gains from retaining more private benefits do not compensate for the higher price. Fur-
thermore, since lower-valued types retain a smaller fraction of their private benefits, separating equilibria
can have an interior cut-off type XcS ∈ (0,X) whose retained private benefits α
(
XcS
)
Φ(XcS ) just equal her
total takeover premium r
(
XcS
)[
P
(
XcS
)−K(XcS ;XcS )]. By contrast, the highest-valued type purchases shares
at P
(
X
)
= X and retains all private benefits, Φ(X), thus reaping her full information profit.
Being able to relinquish private benefits does not ensure the existence of separating equilibria. Proposi-
tion 2 identifies two further conditions. First, the bidder must be able to commit to relinquish the fraction of
private benefits announced in the offer. Otherwise, the modified setting is de facto reduced to the case with
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exogenous private benefits, since any bidder would opportunistically renege on the announced α and retain
all private benefits. Second, forgoing private benefits must be informative such that the shareholders can
infer the post-takeover security benefits. A sufficient condition for this is that Φ(·) is non-decreasing. This
ensures that relinquishing a given fraction of private benefits is more costly for higher-valued types, that is,
the single crossing property holds.13 As we show below, the assumption of Φ(·) non-decreasing is satisfied
in well-known variants of the tender offer game.
The bid restriction is a redundant signal because bidders reveal their type by relinquishing private ben-
efits. This is done through the choice of α , and not of r. Therefore, bid restrictions, while affecting α (·)
and P(·) through (3), are a source of equilibrium multiplicity. For instance, separating equilibria can be sup-
ported for any uniform restriction, r (X) = r ∈ [0.5,1]. Another source of multiplicity is that the free-rider
condition (c) is an inequality. Accordingly, shareholders accept prices that match or exceed the expected
post-takeover security benefits, which implies that multiple price schedules can be supported as separating
equilibria.
The above framework and Proposition 2 are cast in terms of the bidder relinquishing part of her private
benefits. Equivalently, the analysis can be framed in terms of the bidder extracting part of the total value
as private benefits. This is, in fact, the perspective taken in the literature building on Grossman and Hart
(1980). Its focus is the means by which the bidder can exclude (minority) shareholders from part of the
takeover value to overcome the free-rider problem. Identified exclusion mechanisms, such as toeholds, map
into our abstract technology of relinquishing part of the private benefits.
3.1.1 Toehold acquisition
One exclusion mechanism, first studied by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), are equity stakes purchased prior
to the tender offer (toeholds). Consider a target firm approached by a bidder. If the bidder gains control,
she generates total post-takeover value V ∈ V , which is private information to her. Suppose the bidder can
purchase up to a fraction t of the target shares in the open market—for simplicity, at the price of P = 0—
before making a tender offer. The upper bound t represents a mandatory disclosure rule that essentially
prevents the bidder from acquiring further shares at prices below the takeover bid.
By acquiring a toehold t ∈ (0, t] prior to the bid, the bidder excludes t initial target shareholders from the
takeover gains. Since these open market purchases do not affect the post-takeover value of the shares, the
free-rider condition is P≥V . The bidder’s payoff from a successful takeover is
Π= tV + r(V −P)
with r ∈ [0.5− t,1− t].
13When Φ(·) is decreasing or non-monotonic, no general result obtains. One can find examples in which separation is feasible and
others in which only pooling equilibria exist.
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By defining α ≡ t/t, X ≡V , and Φ≡ tV , we can rewrite the bidder’s payoff as
Π= αΦ(X)+ r(X−P)
and the free-rider condition as P≥ X . Thus, the tender offer game with toehold acquisition is isomorphic to
our generic framework for k = 0.
Importantly, toeholds as an exclusion mechanism satisfy the commitment and informativeness require-
ments: The bidder decides the size of the toehold prior to the tender offer, and the value of a toehold naturally
increases with the security benefits, so that Φ′(X) = t ≥ 0. Thus, by Proposition 2, toeholds are a viable
signal and, in a separating equilibrium, bidders that acquire larger toeholds pay higher prices.
The signaling potential of toeholds has been analyzed within a probabilistic tender offer game by Chowdhry
and Jegadeesh (1990). Our analysis shows that toeholds as a signal are but an example of the generic exclu-
sion mechanism, and that they do not rely upon probabilistic outcomes.
3.1.2 Debt finance
Müller and Panunzi (2004) show that the bidder can use leverage to exclude target shareholders from (part
of the) security benefits. The bidder sets up a shell company that issues debt backed by claims on the target
assets. She then makes a tender offer for the target shares and, if the bid succeeds, merges the target firm
with the shell company. This two-step process is referred to as a bootstrap acquisition. As before, the bidder
generates a post-takeover value V . In addition, she can raise debt D up to a limit D¯. To avoid bankruptcy
issues, we impose a lower bound on the post-takeover share value V > D¯.
Raising debt against target assets lowers the post-takeover security benefits as part of the value is paid to
the debtholders. This allows the bidder to acquire the target at a lower price, and hence to appropriate part
of the takeover gains. By the same token, raising less debt means having to pay a higher price, and hence
the free-rider condition is P≥V −D. The bidder’s payoff from a successful takeover is
Π= D+ r(V −D−P).
By redefining α ≡ D/D¯, X ≡V − D¯, and Φ≡ D¯, we can rewrite the bidder’s payoff as
Π= αD¯+ r[(V − D¯)+(D¯−D)−P] = αΦ+ r[X +(1−α)Φ−P]
and the free-rider condition as P ≥ (V − D¯)+ (D¯−D) = X +(1−α)Φ. Thus, the tender offer game with
debt financing is isomorphic to our generic framework for k = 1.
Like toeholds, the debt is in place at the time of the bid, thereby committing the bidder to an exclusion
level, and its value is non-decreasing in the security benefits, that is, Φ′(X) = 0. Hence, debt financing is a
viable signal and, in a separating equilibrium, bidders that raise more debt pay higher prices.14
14Osano (2009) also analyzes the role of leverage in a tender offer game with private information but primarily focuses on pooling
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3.1.3 Diversion
The exclusion mechanism introduced by Grossman and Hart (1980) is to let the bidder divert resources
for private consumption once she is in control. Suppose the bidder chooses which fraction φ ∈ [0, φ¯ ] of the
firm’s total post-takeover value V ∈V to divert as private benefits. The upper bound φ¯ < 1 reflects exogenous
constraints on diversion set by, e.g., shareholder protection laws. A successful bid results in private benefits
φV and actual security benefits (1− φ)V . Consequently, the free-rider condition is P ≥ (1− φ)V . The
bidder’s payoff from a successful takeover is
Π= φV + r[(1−φ)V −P].
By defining α ≡ φ/φ¯ , X ≡ (1− φ¯)V , and Φ≡ φ¯V , we can rewrite the bidder’s payoff as
Π= αφ¯V + r[(V − φ¯V )+(φ¯V −φV )−P] = αΦ+ r[X +(1−α)Φ−P]
and the free-rider condition as P ≥ (V − φ¯V )+ (φ¯V − φV ) = X +(1−α)Φ. Thus, the tender offer game
with diversion is isomorphic to our generic framework for k = 1. In a separating equilibrium, higher types
extract a larger fraction of total value as private benefits and pay a higher price.
Separation is possible because the diversion technology satisfies the informativeness requirement: Φ′(X)=
φ¯
/
(1− φ¯) . It is, however, debatable whether bidders can, in practice, commit not to divert more once they
are in control. On the one hand, the bidder is free to include in the offer provisions that limit her discretion,
by either excluding certain types of post-takeover activities (e.g., asset transfers) or strengthening gover-
nance (e.g., independent directors). On the other hand, it is questionable to what extent such provisions
effectively constrain extraction, let alone, fine-tune the bidder’s extraction ability in a way that allows her to
signal her type.
In the latter case a moral hazard problem arises: Without effective governance provisions, the controlling
party chooses the level of private benefits opportunistically. The ownership stake of the controlling party
may affect such discretionary private benefit extraction: A larger stake can reduce the bidder’s incentives
to engage in wasteful opportunism once she is in control (the “alignment” effect; Jensen and Meckling,
1976). At the same time, it could strengthen the bidder’s ability to act opportunistically (the “entrenchment”
effect; Morck et al., 1998). Either effect opens up the possibility that low-valued bidders reveal their type by
committing to less private benefits via their choice of ownership stake. We show in the Appendix that this is
indeed feasible in the “entrenchment” setting, but not in the “alignment” setting.
3.1.4 Bidder assets
Typically, tender offer models abstract from bidder assets other than cash. When the bidder owns assets,
she could use claims on her assets to pay target shareholders, and the willingness to do so might reveal her
equilibria. In fact, the signaling incentives we describe here do not arise under his model assumptions.
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type. Suppose a bidder owns cash and a firm. If the bidder acquires control of the target firm, assets in both
firms increase in value: target assets from 0 to X , and bidder assets from 0 to λX . The total value created
by the takeover is thus V = X +λX . The value increase in bidder assets represents the private benefits. The
parameter λ > 0 is commonly known and the same for all bidder types.
The bidder makes a tender offer through her own firm, which assumes ownership of the tendered shares.
If a fraction β ≥ 0.5 of the target shares is tendered, the bidder firm has a post-takeover value of λX +βX .
The bidder wants to merge the firms (β = 1), and offers target shareholders a cash price C and 1− s shares
of the merged company. To have control of the merged firm, the bidder must retain s≥ 0.5.
Target shareholders tender only if the value of the cash-equity offer exceeds X , the value of a minority
share in the target firm. The free-rider condition is thus C+ (1− s)V ≥ X . The bidder’s payoff from a
successful merger is
Π= sV −C = sλX + sX−C.
By defining α ≡ s, Φ ≡ λX , and r ≡ s, and expressing the cash price in terms of the shares the bidder
holds in the merged company, C = sP, we can rewrite the bidder’s payoff as
Π= αΦ+ r(X−P)
and the free-rider condition as rP+(1− r)(X +Φ) ≥ X , which simplifies to rP+(1− r)Φ ≥ rX . Clearly,
this condition is satisfied for P = X . We can therefore map the merger game into our generic framework
with k = 0 and the additional constraint r = α . Since a separating equilibrium can be constructed for any
r(·) in the generic framework, this constraint can indeed be satisfied (see Appendix).
In the separating equilibrium, the cash price C is inversely related to the shares s offered to target share-
holders. Lower-valued bidders pay more in equity, which amounts to relinquishing a larger fraction of their
private benefits λX .15 Since the level of exclusion is set in the offer through the equity component s, the
commitment requirement is fulfilled. The informativeness requirement is satisfied because Φ′(X) = λ , but
more fundamentally, because the bidder’s information advantage is one-dimensional: It pertains only to a
factor common to both firms, such that the value improvement of one firm is a sufficient statistic for the
other. This seems unlikely to hold in practice, where bidders are bound to have private information about
idiosyncratic factors as well. Indeed, the informativeness requirement cannot be satisfied in the case of
two-dimensional private information (see Section 3.4).
3.1.5 Probabilistic outcomes
Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) show that a separating equilibrium can be constructed when target sharehold-
ers play probabilistic tendering strategies. To illustrate their result, we revisit the tender offer game with
15Higher-valued bidders offering a larger cash component is also a result found in the means-of-payment literature (e.g., Eckbo et
al., 1990). In these bilateral merger models, the result relies on two-sided asymmetric information. Here, only the bidder has private
information.
14
non-transferable private benefits where the free-rider condition simply is P ≥ X (Section 2). Contrary to
before, we assume that shareholders randomize their tendering decision if they are strictly indifferent after
having observed the bid price P and updated their beliefs. This assumption generates probabilistic outcomes
when the offered price exactly matches the expected security benefits. Otherwise, shareholders either always
or never tender. Given an offer P = E(X |r,P), the success probability q can lie anywhere in [0,1], and the
expected fraction of acquired shares γ can lie anywhere in [0.5,1]. The bidder’s expected payoff from a bid
is therefore
Π= q [Φ+ γ (X−P)] .
By defining α ≡ q and r ≡ qγ , we can rewrite this payoff as
Π= αΦ+ r(X−P)
and the free-rider condition remains P ≥ X . Thus, the probabilistic tender offer game is isomorphic to
our generic framework for k = 0 and the additional constraint r = γα . As in the merger application, this
additional constraint can be satisfied (see Appendix).
In equilibrium, a lower-valued bidder pays a smaller price but her bid is less likely to succeed. The
higher failure rate protects her bid from being mimicked by higher-valued types. Importantly, this deterrence
effect operates exclusively through the risk of losing private benefits. In fact, if Φ(·) = 0 or even if merely
Φ(X) = 0, the signaling equilibrium breaks down.
Revealing bids with probabilistic outcomes are but another illustration of the common principle in Propo-
sition 2. The specific feature is that bidders do not signal their type through relinquishing private benefits
to the shareholders, but rather through “burning” private benefits by way of failure. Common to the other
applications, the outcome is inefficient: While all types actually make a bid in equilibrium, bids do not
always succeed. Furthermore, the bid restriction remains a redundant signal and there are multiple equilib-
rium schedules. Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) select a schedule where all types restrict their bid as much as
possible (r = 0.5).
3.2 Pooling equilibria
In a pooling equilibrium, the subset of bidder types that make a bid submit the same offer (rP,αP,PP). This
pooling offer is individually rational for a bidder if
αPΦ(X)+ rP[K(αP,X)−PP]≥ 0. (4)
LetX(rP,αP,PP) ⊆X denote the set of bidder types for whom the participation constraint (4) is satisfied. The
pooling offer must also satisfy the free-rider condition
PP ≥ E[K(αP,X)|X ∈X(rP,αP,PP)]. (5)
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Proposition 3. There always exists a pooling equilibrium, in which all and only bidders X ∈X(rP,αP,PP)
make a bid and offer the same contract (rP,αP,PP).
The equilibrium bid only reveals that the bidder belongs to the subset of types who profit from this bid.
Among the successful bidder types, some are undervalued and some are overvalued. For some types, the
mispricing may be so severe that a takeover at that price is unprofitable; hence, these types do not bid.
There exist multiple offers that satisfy (4) and (5) and hence constitute Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
Multiplicity not only arises from variations in αP and rP but also because the equilibrium price may exceed
the conditional expectation of the security benefits, that is, the free-rider condition need not bind. In addition,
there exist pooling equilibria with probabilistic outcomes, though they are Pareto-dominated.16
The existence of pooling equilibria neither requires transferable private benefits nor imposes constraints
on the shape ofΦ(·). Depending on the shape ofΦ(·) and the bidder type distribution G(·), the setX(rP,αP,PP)
can consist of disjoint intervals. In particular, there need not exist a threshold type such that all and only
types above the threshold make a bid. Furthermore, there can be equilibria in which different bidder sets
offer different contracts. For example, there can be an equilibrium in which the highest types pool on one
contract and the lowest types on another (see Appendix for details).
3.3 Efficiency and robustness
When separating equilibria and pooling equilibria co-exist, their relative efficiency and robustness is of
interest.
Proposition 4. The most efficient equilibrium can be either separating or pooling depending on the distri-
bution of bidder types.
A general efficiency ranking cannot be made because the bidder type distribution G(·) determines bid
prices and the set of types making an offer in a pooling equilibrium but not in a separating equilibrium. We
illustrate this point for the case of increasing private benefits Φ(·) and k = 0. From Proposition 2, we know
that in the separating equilibrium bids are made only by bidders above some cut-off type XcS ∈ (0,X), who
makes zero profit. For k = 0, the cut-off type is minimized by setting the bid restriction to r(·) = 1/2 (as we
show in Section 4.1 below) and pinned down by the equation
ˆ X
XcS
{
Φ′(u)
[
1−
ˆ X
u
1
2Φ(v)
dv
]
+0.5
}
du =Φ(X)
16Consider a probabilistic pooling equilibrium in which the pooling offer with r and P succeeds with probability q. For type X ,
submitting this offer is individually rational if and only if q [Φ(X)+ r (X−P)]≥ 0. The sign of the left-hand side is independent of the
takeover probability, so that changes in q leave the set of types for whom the participation constraint is satisfied, and hence shareholders’
expectations about the post-takeover share value conditional on a bid, unaffected. Thus, if a pooling equilibrium offer can be supported
under probabilistic outcomes, it can also be supported under deterministic outcomes. Given that all bidder types are value-improving,
the probabilistic pooling outcomes are Pareto-dominated by the corresponding deterministic outcome.
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which we obtain by substituting (13) into (14) for P(X) = X (see the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix).
This equation contains, except for XcS , only exogenous variables but, importantly, is independent of G(·).
Compare this to the pooling equilibria from Proposition 3. With Φ(·) increasing, lower bidder types are
strictly less inclined to bid, so the set of active bidders X(rP,αP,PP) is a closed interval [X
c
P,X ]. In this case
(first analyzed by Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), the most efficient equilibrium is one where bidders extract their
full private benefits (α = 1), shareholders receive the smallest acceptable price (the free-rider condition (5)
strictly binds), and the least number of shares is traded (r = 1/2). Selecting this equilibrium and substituting
the binding free-rider condition (5) into the participation constraint (4) pins down the cut-off type XcP. For
k = 0, this gives
Φ(XcP)+0.5
[
XcP−
ˆ X
XcP
g(u)udu
]
= 0
where the integral represents the average security benefits of the types above XcP and g(·) is the probability
density function associated with G(·). Hence, we can move the cut-off type XcP by changing G(·). If we
shift more probability mass to the types below (above) XcP, the left-hand side increases (decreases), in which
case the cut-off type must decrease (increase) to restore the equality. In fact, we can choose a distribution
function such that the cut-off type is arbitrarily close to the lower (upper) bound of X . By contrast, such
manipulations leave the cut-off type in the separating equilibrium, XcS , unaffected. For X
c
S > 0, there conse-
quently exist G(·) such that XcP lies below or above XcS , making the pooling equilibrium more or less efficient
than the separating equilibrium. The same reasoning applies to the comparison of the pooling equilibria in
Proposition 3 with partially separating equilibria in which different bidder sets offer different contracts (see
Appendix for details).
Proposition 4 also implies that the separating and pooling outcomes can in general not be Pareto ranked
either. Moreover, even if one outcome is more efficient than another, it need not be Pareto dominant: In a
pooling equilibrium, the highest bidder types always buy shares at a discount. Therefore, they always prefer
a pooling equilibrium with α = 1 even when a separating equilibrium is more efficient. At the same time,
target shareholders earn information rents in a separating equilibrium and may hence prefer it over a more
efficient pooling equilibrium.
While pooling and separating equilibria cannot be ranked in terms of efficiency, there is a clear-cut result
with respect to their robustness.
Proposition 5. Only the separating equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion.
In any pooling equilibrium, some bidder types pay more, and others less, than their respective actual
post-takeover security benefits. Given that Φ′(·) ≥ 0, there always exists a deviating offer with a lower
price in combination with a smaller quantity or smaller expected private benefits that is attractive only to
the overpaying types. Such a deviation exists because forgoing private benefits, purchasing fewer shares, or
failing with a higher probability is less attractive to higher-valued bidders. Under the intuitive criterion, the
17
deviating offer must be attributed only to the overpaying types and is therefore not rejected. This eliminates
all pooling equilibria except for the degenerate case where only the highest-valued bidder makes a bid with
positive probability.
3.4 Two-dimensional asymmetric information
Proposition 2 establishes that separation requires the bidder to relinquish private benefits in a manner which
is informative. We now examine whether this is still feasible when the bidder has additional private informa-
tion about her private benefits Φ, which is independent of the security benefits X . To this end, we consider
two-dimensional bidder types, (X ,Φ), that are continuously distributed on [X ,X ]× [Φ,Φ]. The bidder is
informed about both dimensions of her type. In contrast, the target shareholders neither know how much a
particular bidder will improve the share value nor how much she values control. The setting is otherwise the
same as in Section 3.1.
Proposition 6. In tender offer games with two-dimensional bidder types, there exists no separating equilib-
rium in which a bidder’s post-takeover security benefits are fully revealed.
Signaling breaks down because the private information about Φ undermines the “credibility” of the
exclusion level α as a signal. Since Φ is not a sufficient statistic of X , target shareholders cannot infer the
level of security benefits from an offer conceding 1−α of the private benefits. The ambiguous relation
between Φ and X “jams” the signal.17
Proposition 2 and Proposition 6 together imply that full revelation is feasible only if (knowing what the
bidder knows about) the security benefits are a sufficient statistic of (what the bidder knows about) the private
benefits. Whether or not this is an appropriate assumption depends on the specific exclusion mechanism.
In case of toeholds or leverage, the assumption holds because the value of the private benefits is directly
derived from the security benefits. This also applies to diversion if the scope for private benefit extraction
is determined by target firm characteristics or the institutional environment, but is independent of bidder
characteristics. By contrast, it is plausible to argue that bidder assets are at least to some extent unrelated
to target assets, and that the bidder has additional private information about her own assets. Accordingly,
Proposition 6 reinforces the conclusion from Corollary 1 that cash-equity offers are unlikely to be effective
signaling devices in tender offers.
4 Unbundling control and ownership
At et al. (2011) and Marquez and Yilmaz (2012) show in similar settings that a target firm can influence the
set of active bidder types in a pooling equilibrium by changing its security-voting structure. The specific
17Pooling equilibria exist also in the case of two-dimensional bidder types. Indeed, the proof of Proposition 3 does not rely on any
specific relationship between security benefits and private benefits.
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applications they study are dual-class share structures and (supermajority) voting rules, both of which affect
the fraction of cash flow rights a shareholder must own in order to exercise control, i.e., the degree to which
control and ownership are separated in the firm.
In this section, we examine two complementary questions. First, we ask how the target firm’s security-
voting structure affects the set of active bidder types in separating equilibria. Second, we ask how the
outcome changes if the bidder (rather than the target firm) separates cash flow and voting rights through
the offer terms. Such unbundling is easily achieved by using securities other than cash and voting equity as
means of payment.
4.1 Bid restrictions
We address the first question in the framework with one-dimensional bidder types and transferable private
benefits (Section 3.1) by studying the impact of a constant bid restriction r(·) = r on the cut-off type in a
separating equilibrium. We know that the bid restriction is a redundant signal in this setting. A supermajority
rule that increases the number of votes required to pass a shareholder decision can be interpreted as an
increase in r. Similarly, the introduction of non-voting shares can be interpreted as a decrease in r. Note
that we retain the assumption that the bidder must pay target shareholders in cash or ordinary shares of the
post-takeover firm, and the original parameter restriction r ≥ 0.5. The following result is an afterthought to
Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. In tender offer games where bidders can commit to relinquish any fraction of their private
benefits and Φ(·) is a non-decreasing function, the cut-off type XcS ∈ [0,X) in the separating equilibrium
increases with a constant bid restriction r for k = 0. For k = 1, the same is true if Φ′(X)< 1.
Smaller transaction sizes mitigate the asymmetric information problem: With fewer traded shares, a bid-
der gains less (in total) from paying a price below the post-takeover share value. This reduces the incentives
to mimic low-valued bidders who, as a result, need to relinquish less private benefits to credibly reveal their
type. This result holds for all but one of the applications reviewed in Section 3.1.18 In particular, consider
the two applications where k = 1. In the case of debt finance, we had Φ′(X) = 0, and in the case of diversion,
Φ′(X) = φ¯
/
(1− φ¯) which is smaller than 1 so long as the bidder cannot divert more than half of total firm
value.
Of course, Corollary 2 also relies on the conditions that ensure existence of the separating equilibria
derived in Section 3.1. However, as we show below, these conditions no longer pose a constraint when it is
the bidder herself who can unbundle cash flow and voting rights.
18The exception is the application with bidder assets (Section 3.1.4) where the bidder has to acquire the entire target to merge the
assets, and then varies the fraction of post-merger equity transferred to target shareholders (as a way of relinquishing private benefits)
depending on her type. By the nature of the solution, a constant “bid restriction” is impossible in this case.
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4.2 Dual-class offers
In essence, Corollary 2 states that efficiency is decreasing in the fraction of ownership traded. This is due to
the assumption that the gains from trade are contingent on the transfer of control, not the transfer of security
benefits. While this is a stark assumption, it highlights why target shareholders who do not value control may
be reluctant to sell it: The asymmetric information problem in the trade of security benefits contaminates the
trade of control rights as long as the two are bundled.
The most straightforward way for the bidder to unbundle control and ownership is to make a dual-class
security-exchange offer. The bidder offers to exchange each of the target’s voting shares against a non-voting
share. Shareholders accept the bid as it preserves their fraction of the cash flow rights. By construction, the
bidder pays exactly the post-takeover security benefits. This replicates the full information outcome without
revealing the bidder’s type.
Despite resolving the asymmetric information problem, the dual-class offer is problematic because it
leaves all cash flow rights with the shareholders. That is, the bidder has no equity interest in the firm after
the takeover. On the one hand, this makes the offer equivalent to a simple replacement of management,
which begs the question why a takeover is necessary in the first place. On the other hand, it makes the offer
prone to abuse by value-decreasing bidders, since it does not require the bidder to put up any cash (Bebchuk
and Hart, 2001). Cash payments put at least some (lower) bounds on the bidder’s quality.
The latter point emerges when the parameters allow for value-decreasing bidder types. Let the security
benefits under the incumbent temporarily be XI > 0, instead of zero, thereby allowing for bidder types
X ∈ [0,XI ] ⊂X for whom X +Φ(X) < XI . In this setting, a dual-class exchange need not be efficient:
Target shareholders might accept non-voting shares worth less than XI and so concede control to a bidder
who lowers total firm value. Suppose target shareholders would not knowingly accept such offers. It is
straightforward to support a separating equilibrium in which any offer with a cash price less than XI –
including a dual-class exchange offer – fails because shareholders attribute it to the least valuable bidder
type, and bids paying more than XI in cash are constructed according to the separating schedule in Section
3.1. Clearly, any bidder willing to pay at least XI in cash must be a value-increasing type.
This argument also carries over to a setting in which the bidder can choose to extract up to a fraction φ of
the post-takeover firm value V as private benefits (as in Section 3.1.3), so that security benefits are (1−φ)V .
Here, target shareholders lose wealth if they accept a dual-class exchange offer from bidder types for whom
(1−φ)V < XI . Again, one can construct a separating equilibrium in which offers with a cash price below XI
are rejected, thereby eliciting only bids in which the cash component is high enough to imply that the value
created by the bidder equals at least the security benefits under the incumbent.
4.3 Options
Dual-class exchanges are extreme in that the bidder does not acquire any cash flow rights. However, the
problem is not that bidders are unwilling to buy any cash flow. Rather, it is that bidders are not – or only to
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a limited extent – willing to pay for cash flows which they know do not exist. This problem is more suitably
resolved by a cash offer that is combined with securities that leave (only) the “non-existing” cash flows to
target shareholders. In the present setting, call options provide such a solution. It merely requires that every
type X ∈X purchases a target share in exchange for cash P(X) = X and a (cash-settled) call option with an
exercise price of S(X) = X .19
Proposition 7. Offers with call options allow to implement the full information outcome.
If a type X would succeed with an offer x< X , she would pay a cash price x for shares that are worth X .
However, ex post she would not capitalize on this gain, as the target shareholders would exercise their options
once the value improvement materializes. Conversely, the low-valued type does not mimic the high-valued
type because she would pay X for shares that are worth x. Thus, the offer schedule is incentive-compatible,
and every bidder succeeds irrespective of her private benefits. Indeed, the separating equilibrium is efficient
and its existence does not rely on the shape of Φ(·), i.e., a specific relationship between private benefits and
security benefits.
Derivatives enable the bidder (i) to trade economic ownership void of voting rights and (ii) to issue non-
linear contingent claims. The first step of the transaction consists of acquiring the target shares and stripping
them of their votes. In the second step, the bidder re-issues some cash flow rights, restructured into claims
that punish her for “lying” about the security benefits. The call options which are executed when the post-
takeover security benefits are higher than professed penalize the pretense of low security benefits – ex post
when the true value is observed. This offer amounts to the simplest solution to the asymmetric information
problem: a bid price which is de facto contingent on the post-takeover share value.20 The offer transfers,
cash aside, only future claims but no actual future cash flows to target shareholders. This is an artifact of the
assumption that the post-takeover security benefits X are deterministic (perfectly known by the bidder). Yet,
the result carries over to a setting with stochastic cash flows (see Appendix).
It is worth comparing the control-cash flow allocation implied by Proposition 7 with those obtained in
well-known capital structure models. In our setting, separating ownership and control as well as conced-
ing the “upside” to non-controlling investors can improve efficiency. The former prevents that frictions in
the cash flow trade spill over into the vote trade, while the latter allows bidders to effectively signal a low
valuation. This contrasts with the conclusions from both external financing models, where the controlling
party retains ownership and the “upside” to signal a high valuation (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Myers and Ma-
jluf, 1984), and moral hazard models, where retaining ownership and the “upside” improves the controlling
party’s incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Innes, 1990). In Section 5, we formally explore the ten-
sion between the signaling benefits and the potential moral hazard costs of unbundling within our takeover
setting.
19In a setting with value-decreasing bidder types, the analogous offer would (have to) be P(X) = max{X ,XI} and S(X) = X .
20Though, note that an offer in which the bidder pays (no cash upfront but) only a contingent price after implementing post-takeover
changes is prone to exactly the same problems as a dual-class exchange offer.
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4.4 Shareholder activism and empty voting
The insight that the separation of cash flow and voting rights mitigates asymmetric information problems is
not confined to tender offers. This is perhaps best illustrated by adapting the present model to the case of
an activist investor who has superior information about the value consequences of a shareholder proposal.
Suppose the investor already owns a minority stake t in a firm and faces an uninformed market-maker in the
secondary market. The investor knows that the proposal, if approved, increases the security benefits from
currently 0 to X . As in Brav and Matthews (2011), the voting process is noisy and the investor can increase
the probability that the proposal is approved by acquiring more voting shares. Let q(b) denote the approval
probability and b the fraction of voting shares bought in the open market with q′(b)> 0 and q(0) = 0.
To meet the investor’s buy order b, the market-maker has to go short in the stock which exposes her to
price risk. For a given b, the market-maker is willing to take the short side of the transaction if P≥ q(b)X ,
which is analogous to the free-rider condition in tender offer games. The problem is that, contrary to the
activist investor, she does not know the true value of X . As in the tender offer game, the buyer (investor)
must therefore convince the seller (market-maker) that the transaction price is adequate.
One can construct a separating schedule with “market” orders b or “limit” orders (b,P). In either case, the
r-P-schedule has to meet the same incentive compatibility constraints. The bidder’s payoff from a successful
activist campaign is
Π= q(b)tX +q(b)bX−bP.
By defining Φ≡ tX and Pˆ≡ P/q(b), we can rewrite the bidder’s payoff as
Π= q(b)
[
Φ+b
(
X− Pˆ)]
and the free-rider condition as Pˆ ≥ X . This has the same structure as in the probabilistic tender offer game
(Section 3.1.5) except that (i) the per-unit price Pˆ is normalized by the success probability and (ii) there is
an intrinsic relationship between q(b) and b. Following the same procedure as before, we further define
α ≡ q(b) and r ≡ q(b)b to get Π = αΦ+ r(X− Pˆ), and can then apply Proposition 2 with the additional
constraint r = αq−1(α), where q−1(·) is the inverse of q(·). Because r is a redundant signal, the additional
constraint can in principle be satisfied. To give one example, if q(b) = b.5−t , the constraint is isomorphic to
the one in the probabilistic tender offer game, r = γα , with γ = .5− t.
In a separating equilibrium characterized by Proposition 2, α ≡ q(b) is increasing in X . The underlying
intuition is the same as in the probabilistic signaling equilibrium. When the potential value improvement is
small, the investor buys fewer shares at a lower price, and the proposal is less likely to be approved. The high
failure rate justifies the low price, as it prevents mimicking from higher-valued types. This deterrence effect
operates through the risk of forgoing the value improvement in the initial stake t. Conversely, the investor is
keen on buying more voting shares when larger value improvements are “at stake” in the shareholder vote.
As in Proposition 7, the activist could also unbundle cash flow and voting rights to implement the sym-
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metric information outcome. In principle, the investor could offer to buy (0.5− t) voting shares at the price
P= X and simultaneously enter a derivative contract with which she goes short in (0.5− t) call options with
strike price X . This would allow the investor to purchase sufficient voting shares to ensure that the proposal
is accepted. The derivatives position of the activist investor represents a “bet” against the firm. This negative
exposure is a prerequisite for buying the shares at the fair price, i.e., for acquiring the attached voting rights
at no (additional) cost. The additional voting rights attained in this way are void of ownership and therefore
referred to as empty voting. A transaction to the same effect is to borrow voting shares to register more votes
on the record date but to return the shares before the actual vote (Christofferson et al., 2007).21
5 Moral hazard cost of signaling
We have alluded to the reservation that unbundling, while useful for signaling, may be problematic in the
presence of moral hazard. To examine this question, we consider an extension of our framework in which
the design of the tender offer affects not only the resolution of asymmetric information during the bid but
also the bidder’s incentives to improve firm value after the takeover.
Suppose the bidder, once in control, generates total firm value V = V (e;θ) at private cost C(e), where
e≥ 0 denotes her chosen effort level and θ her productivity. The bidder can extract up to B(e;θ) in private
benefits, in which case the security benefits are X(e;θ) = V (e;θ)− kB(e;θ). As before, we include the
parameter k ∈ {0,1} to account for the possibility that private benefit extraction may (or may not) reduce
security benefits. All functions are twice continuously differentiable. We assume that firm value increases
in effort and productivity (Ve,Vθ > 0); the marginal return to effort weakly decreases in effort but weakly
increases in productivity (Vee ≤ 0, Veθ ≥ 0); and the cost of effort is increasing and convex (Ce,Cee > 0).
Furthermore, baseline private benefits and security benefits are positively related (∂B/∂X ≥ 0), as in all the
applications of Section 3.
The bidder knows her type θ and subsequent effort choice e, while target shareholders only know that θ
is continuously distributed on Θ= [θ ,θ ] according to the distribution function H(θ). As before, the security
benefits under the incumbent management are known to all shareholders and normalised to zero.
To explore the extent to which moral hazard undermines the optimality of unbundling, we must analyze a
setting in which the bidder can both use derivatives as means of payment (as in Section 4) and forgo private
benefits (as in Section 3), rather than being confined to one or the other signaling device. Hence, a bid
C = (β ,r,P,S ) specifies a fraction β of private benefits retained, a bid restriction r, a cash price P, and a
paymentS contingent on post-takeover security benefits. The bidder’s payoff from a successful takeover is
Π(C ,e) = βB(e;θ)−C(e)+ rK(e;θ)− rP− rS (K)
21Prior to a shareholder meeting, a voting record date is scheduled by the board of directors. Investors who hold shares on the record
date are allowed to vote at the meeting. The empty voting strategy described above, known as record date capture, is possible because
the voting record date typically precedes the actual shareholder meeting by a month or so.
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where K = X(e;θ)+ (1−β )kB(e;θ). In a separating equilibrium, the bidder chooses C to maximize this
payoff subject to the non-mimicking constraints, the free-rider condition
rP+ rS (K)≥ rK(e;θ),
and the post-takeover incentive constraint
β
∂B(e;θ)
∂e
+ r
∂K(e;θ)
∂e
− r∂S (K)
∂K
∂K(e;θ)
∂e
=
∂C(e)
∂e
. (6)
Chosen after the takeover, the bidder’s effort maximizes the sum of her net private benefits, acquired “long”
controlling equity position, and “short” position as per the contingent payment.
Proposition 8. With costly post-takeover effort, bidders use unbundling to implement the full information
outcome, and each bidder type maximizes net private benefits.
Introducing moral hazard does not overturn the optimality of unbundling; nor does unbundling preclude
post-takeover effort provision. The intuition behind this result is as follows: Conditional on effort, the bidder
issues call options to resolve the information asymmetry. Conversely, conditional on symmetric information,
she chooses offer terms that maximize her private returns to effort. Any gain in security benefits she brings
about is extracted by the free-riding shareholders, as shown by Burkart et al. (1998). To limit such extrac-
tion, the bidder uses call options to “cap” her exposure to security benefits, thereby diluting post-takeover
incentives. Unbundling thus allows her to simultaneously counteract “overworking” and “overestimation”
of security benefits – the two problems that arise from the interaction of the shareholders’ free-riding behav-
ior with moral hazard and asymmetric information. Indeed, it turns out that the optimal contract not only
restores full information but also reduces the post-takeover incentive constraint (6) to
∂B(e;θ)
∂e
=
∂C(e)
∂e
. (7)
That is, the bidder uses her short call option position to neutralize the incentives induced by her controlling
equity stake to such an extent that her optimal post-takever effort equates marginal cost to marginal private
benefit.
The above analysis may suggest that restrictions on unbundling improve incentives to create value. If so,
unbundling entails a trade-off between the outside governance problem (facilitating control transfers) and the
inside governance problem (mitigating moral hazard). So consider the contracting environment of Section 3
where the means of payment are restricted to cash and common equity (S = 0). The bidder chooses a more
limited contract, C = (β ,r,P,0), to maximize her payoff
Π(C ,e) = βB(e;θ)−C(e)+ rK(e;θ)− rP
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subject to non-mimicking constraints, the free-rider condition, and the post-takeover incentive constraint,
which now becomes
β
∂B(e;θ)
∂e
+ r
∂K(e;θ)
∂e
=
∂C(e)
∂e
. (8)
We show in the proof of Proposition 9 that a separating equilibrium exists under reasonable assumptions on
B(·; ·) and X(·; ·).
Proposition 9. Unbundling comes with costs and benefits for post-takeover incentives.
The comparison of (7) and (8) reveals that the absence of unbundling has two countervailing effects:
On one hand, the bidder can no longer “cap” her incentives by using derivatives to offset the equity interest
she has through rK(e;θ), which strengthens post-takeover incentives. On the other hand, to signal her type,
she must now relinquish private benefits by lowering β , with the opposite effect on incentives. This effect
is more pronounced for lower-valued bidders who must relinquish larger fractions of their private benefits,
which can make the net impact on incentives asymmetric across bidder types. More generally, the net impact
depends not only on the type distribution H(θ) but also on assumptions regarding the source of private gains,
which determine the relative sizes of B and K and institutional restrictions on r and β .
Nonetheless, there are cases in which the impact is unambiguous. For example, with toeholds (details in
the proof of Proposition 9), the incentive constraint (8) without unbundling becomes
[β (θ)t+ r(θ)]
∂V (e;θ)
∂e
=
∂C(e)
∂e
,
where β (·) and r(·) denote equilibrium schedules, and the incentive constraint (7) with unbundling becomes
t
∂V (e;θ)
∂e
=
∂C(e)
∂e
.
Since β (θ)t+ r(θ)≥ .5> t, effort is always lower under the constraint with unbundling.22
Corollary 3. If toeholds are the only source of private benefits, unbundling lowers post-takeover incentives
such that the bidder exerts effort as if she owned only a toehold.
This highlights a tension between outside and inside governance: While unbundling resolves the frictions
faced by a control-seeking “outsider,” thereby facilitating a takeover, it lowers her incentives to improve firm
value, should she become the controlling “insider.” In effect, it lowers incentives from a level commensurate
with a majority stake (β t + r ≥ .5) to a level commensurate with a minority stake (t < .5) – which calls
into question what the additional benefit of acquiring control through a takeover is relative to exercising
governance through the kind of investor activism discussed in Section 4.4.
22Unbundling clearly reduces equilibrium effort when the bidder’s maximum private benefits do not exceed the total security benefits
associated with majority ownership. This is naturally true for toeholds, since any admissible toehold is worth less than a majority stake
in the same firm. In the case of diversion, by comparison, this is only true if no more than half of the total firm value can be diverted by
a controlling shareholder.
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6 Empirical implications
The choice of payment method as a means to overcome asymmetric information is a prominent theme in the
literature on mergers and acquisitions. Unlike existing papers in this literature, we find that including equity
is unlikely to provide signaling benefits. Because of the free-rider problem in our framework, it serves as
a signaling device only if the bidder has pre-existing assets that appreciate as a result of the takeover, will
merge these assets with the target, and crucially, possesses no private information about these assets that is
independent of her information about the target. It is highly unlikely that this last condition holds in practice.
P1 Equity as a means of payment is unlikely to resolve asymmetric information problems in tender offers.
The other explanation put forward in the literature against the use of equity in tender offers focuses on the
time delay imposed by the mandatory pre-registration of securities, to which tender offers seem to be more
sensitive than negotiated control transfers (Martin, 1996).23 Empirically, the means of payment indeed cor-
relates strongly with the mode of acquisition. Eckbo (2009) finds that, among about 16,000 U.S. takeovers
between 1980 and 2005, equity was used in roughly a quarter of the tender offers but more than two-thirds
of the mergers.24 While this is suggestive, it should be noted that the choice of acquisition mode is not
exogenous, so that the correlation may be spurious.
Our analysis suggests that, instead of equity, derivatives which provide the seller with a call option-like
claim help to overcome the asymmetric information problem. Earnouts, whereby the seller obtains additional
future compensation if the business subsequently surpasses certain financial targets, are an example of such
a contingent claim frequently used in the acquisition of private firms. There is also evidence of limited use
of convertibles (Finnerty and Yan, 2009). As regards tender offers specifically, we are not aware of any
systematic evidence on the use of such contingent claims, but we surmise that they may not be commonly
used because of impracticality or post-takeover considerations.
First, the objective of many tender offers is to take the target firm private or to merge the target with other
assets. In both cases it becomes difficult to define the underlying asset for derivatives, especially when the
bidder has further private information about the other assets (see Section 3.4). Also, like shares, derivatives
would require preregistration before the tender offer can be consummated. Second, unbundling control and
ownership and relinquishing the “upside” may dilute incentives to improve firm value, possibly to an extent
that questions the purpose of acquiring a majority stake (see Section 5).25
23Other factors that influence the choice between cash and equity in takeovers – such as capital structure, financial slack, and taxes –
are not specific to the mode of acquisition.
24The fact that equity is a prevalent means of payment in management-negotiated mergers is fully consistent with our result, as such
negotiations are not subject to the free-rider problem. Also, while our result states that equity is not a viable signaling device in tender
offers, it does not preclude the possibility that bidders might use equity for other reasons such as, e.g., liquidity constraints.
25To address these issues – measurement and post-takeover incentives – earnout structures often imposes post-closing covenants on
the buyer, requiring, e.g., (i) that the buyer keep books and records for the seller to inspect, (ii) that the buyer maintain a minimum level
of working capital in the business, (iii) that the buyer abstain from any change of control or sale transaction, or (iv) that the buyer make
a commercially reasonable effort to reach the earn-out targets. The monitoring necessary to enforce these covenants will be performed
by the seller of a private firm but not by dispersed shareholders following a tender offer – precisely due to the free-rider problem.
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Neither merging, pre-registration, nor post-takeover incentives are an obstacle for investor activism.
Activist investors trade shares and derivatives on secondary markets and they have engagement objectives
that require a temporary intervention – such as sale of an asset, change in capital structure, or replacement of
directors – with the intention of exiting a target once the stated objective is achieved. We would argue that
it is precisely because activists do not subsequently become “insiders” and their involvement is short-term,
which is often cited as a cause for concern, that they can take advantage of unbundling ownership and control
as an effective and value-enhancing strategy.
P2 Empty voting increases firm value.
In a large data set of Schedule 13-D filings26 by U.S. activist hedge funds, Brav et al. (2008) find that in
16.8 percent of the cases the fund reported derivative positions at the time of the filing, but most of these
positions raised rather than offset the fund’s economic interest in the target. Though as noted by the authors,
there is a lack of reliable data since the disclosure of over-the-counter derivatives and short positions is not
mandatory.
In any case, it would not be inconsistent with our arguments if activists held primarily long (derivative)
positions in the target firm at the time of disclosure. In our analysis in Section 4.4, empty voting enables the
activist to capture the full value improvement in her initial stake (α). Her profits are hence determined both
(i) by her ability to cheaply accumulate a stake prior to disclosing her activist intent and (ii) by her ability
to increase her influence as cheaply as possible after the disclosure. Our empty voting result pertains to (ii).
As concerns (i), it may be argued that taking long derivative positions in the target prior to disclosure allows
the funds to build up an initial stake cheaply. In fact, avoidance of disclosure is precisely the motivation in
the main example Hu and Black (2006) provide for such a derivative position, which they refer to as hidden
(morphable) ownership. By contrast, empty voting becomes relevant post-disclosure once the market knows
of the activist’s intentions (as in our analysis of Section 4.4), and in particular, only when the conflict between
activist and incumbent management escalates into a shareholder vote. Because activists prefer to achieve
their objective without resorting to (though threatening with) a proxy fight, it may not be surprising that they
hold hidden ownership but not yet empty voting positions at the time of the 13-D filing.
Instead, one should expect empty voting positions to materialize ahead of impending shareholder votes,
especially contested ones. Using large data samples from the U.S. and the U.K., Christofferson et al. (2007)
document that share borrowing spikes on voting record dates, especially when the vote is close, and that such
activity biases the voting outcome towards shareholder proposals (or against management proposals), which
suggests that it enhances the influence of outsiders. Note that such “vote trading” is optimal for uninformed
passive shareholders in that it allows them to lend control to activists while capturing the full economic gain
from activism on their shares, i.e., to free-ride. Christofferson et al. (2007) further find, consistent with our
26Schedule 13D filings are mandatory under Section 13(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act and must be filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission within 10 days of acquiring more than 5% of any class of securities of a publicly traded company by investors
who have an interest in influencing the management of the company.
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model of free-riding shareholders (exhibiting full “bargaining power” regarding security benefits but none
regarding control benefits), that the price of the votes is virtually zero.
While we have treated takeovers and activism as separate examples of the outside governance problem,
there is an interesting connection between the two in practice: Activists often put the target “into play” for
acquirers. Studying 13-D filings from 1993 to 2006, Greenwood and Schor (2009) find that announcement
and long-term abnormal returns are high only for targets ultimately acquired and that returns to activism
decline in periods of low takeover activity, findings corroborated by Becht et al. (2014) in a data set of about
1,800 international cases. In light of our analysis, one may speculate whether activism to force a sale of the
firm is a more lucrative intervention than a tender offer (with the same intended outcome) because it can use
temporary “unbundling” to bring about a permanent control change without compromising post-acquisition
incentives – a Trojan Horse unlocking the target for Barbarians at the Gate.27
Several developments over the last decades may have strengthened this advantage of activists – exercising
temporary influence in excess of ownership – over acquirers who, by definition, seek permanent influence
by way of majority ownership: The 1992 proxy reform removing restrictions on communication between
shareholders28, advances in communications technology, and innovations in derivatives markets have made
it easier to mobilize votes without acquiring ownership for a (potential) proxy fight. In the same time period,
overall takeover activity has been on the rise but the fraction of hostile takeovers has been in decline (Betton
et al., 2008, Figure 9); hedge fund activism has increased tremendously and correlates with the number of
interventions that lead to takeovers (Becht et al., 2014, Figure 6); and the use of unbundling in the nexus of
corporate votes, activism, and control contests has become more frequent (Hu and Black, 2008, Table 1).
The co-occurrence of these patterns accords well with the overall message of our theory.29
Going back to tender offers, our results imply that bidder gains and bid premia (target shareholder gains)
should be positively related to the fraction of the takeover surplus that the bidder extracts as private benefits,
provided that the exclusion mechanism qualifies as a viable signal. Of the exclusion mechanisms explored
in this paper, only toeholds and takeover leverage seem to meet the necessary conditions of informativeness
and commitment. The signaling potential of toeholds was first noted by Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994).
Empirically, larger toeholds are indeed positively correlated with bidder gains, consistent with our prediction,
but negatively correlated with bid premia (Eckbo, 2009).30 Bid premia are, however, inherently difficult to
measure since prior expectations of a takeover impound part of the premium into the pre-offer price, which
is of particular concern when the bidder accumulates a toehold. Our prediction regarding takeover leverage
27A recent example involves the pharmaceutical company Valeant and the hedge fund activist William Ackman. In tacit agreement
with Valeant, Ackman accumulated a 9.7 percent stake in Allergan, a target Valeant is interested in, and then announced his intention
of pressuring the incumbent management to agree to a merger with Valeant (De La Merced et al., 2014).
28See, e.g., Sharara and Hoke-Witherspoon (1993), Bradley et al. (2010), and Fos (2013).
29Collaborations like the one between Valeant and William Ackman (see fn. 23), whether explicit or implicit, may in part drive the
shift from hostile takeovers to investor activism observed by recent news articles such as Davidoff (2013): “But unlike hostile takeovers,
there is a real fear on Wall Street of the activists. For now, the question is whether activism will remain on the upswing and be the
disciplining force that the hostile takeover occupied.”
30Eckbo (2009) cites a possible alternative explanation for these empirical patterns, which is that larger toeholds by the initial bidder
may deter potential rival bidders.
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is novel.
P3 In bootstrap tender offer acquisitions, bidder returns and bid premia increase with takeover leverage.
There exist only few empirical studies on takeover financing. Schlingemann (2004) finds that debt raised
during the year before a bid announcement is not significantly related to bidder gains. In contrast, Martynova
and Renneboog (2009) document that the cumulative average abnormal returns for bidders in the 120 days
around bid announcements are significantly larger for debt-financed acquisitions. Most relevant to our paper,
Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) study 115 tender offers and find a positive relation between bidder returns
and the fraction of the acquisition price funded by bank loans. A direct test of our hypothesis would have to
focus on the impact of leverage in bootstrap acquisitions within a sample of uncontested tender offers.31
7 Conclusion
Control contestability is an important aspect of corporate governance. It allows an outsider who can increase
firm value, the sum of security benefits and control benefits, to buy into the firm to influence corporate
decisions. In the absence of frictions, the current owners always agree to sell sufficiently many shares, and
such transactions ensure that control is allocated to its most efficient user.
Public equity markets and dispersed ownership lead to frictions that impede such efficient control trans-
actions. Individually, dispersed shareholders lack the incentives to acquire costly information or to engage
in costly coordination. This free-rider behavior has ramifications for their collective behavior: They do not
exercise their control rights and hence care only about security benefits. In addition, they do not sell their
shares unless they capture the whole value improvement in security benefits that the outsider can generate.
Their lack of information increases their reluctance to sell even further because they suspect the outsider
to understate the value improvement in security benefits. These frictions are arguably most conspicuous in
tender offers, but also afflict shareholder activism.
In a tender offer framework, we show how and to what extent the outsider can overcome these frictions.
Because the outsider is forced to concede all gains in security benefits to free-riding shareholders, she cannot
credibly reveal any information by voluntarily giving up such gains. Instead, the outsider must not only enjoy
private benefits of control, but she must also be able to commit to forgo (part of) these benefits in a manner
that is informative about the security benefits. We analyze various bidding strategies employed in practice
and show that takeover leverage and toeholds, for example, meet these conditions whereas cash-equity offers
and bid restrictions do not.
The reason the bidder has to relinquish control benefits, even though free-riding shareholders are willing
to tender if paid only the security benefits, is that common shares bundle cash flow rights and voting rights.
31Asymmetric information is crucial to our prediction that bid premia increase with takeover leverage. In Müller and Panunzi (2004)’s
symmetric information setting, takeover leverage is negatively correlated with bid premia (though positively with bidder returns) given
that its purpose is to lower the target shareholders’ reservation price. As tentative evidence, they cite Maloney et al. (1993) and Lang et
al. (1991) who find that bidder leverage is positively related to bidder returns but negatively to target shareholder returns, but note that
both studies consider preexisting leverage, as opposed to debt raised as part of a bootstrap acquisition.
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Unbundling these rights reduces the extent to which frictions in the trade of security benefits “spill over” to
the transfer of control. Indeed, we show that it is optimal for the outsider to assume derivative positions that
“bet” against the firm to drive a wedge between her equity voting power and her net economic interest. This
strategy remains optimal when we adapt our framework to analyze activist investors, in which context the
strategy has been labeled empty voting. This insight, interpreted more broadly, suggests that excess returns
to activist investors derive from strategies that lever their influence above and beyond their equity positions.
Such separation of ownership and control, typically considered a source of corporate governance problems,
is an efficient response to the frictions that dispersed ownership causes for control contestability.
Decoupling control from ownership enables bidders (activist investors) to overcome the target (passive)
shareholders’ lack of coordination and information without relinquishing private benefits. Unbundling need
therefore not necessarily undermine the outsiders’ incentives to improve firm value once in control. Decreas-
ing the equity stake required for control clearly weakens incentives, but preserving the private benefits of
control produces a countervailing effect. That said, in settings where the negative effect dominates, a tension
arises between control contestability and post-takeover incentives. For example, when the source of profit
is the appreciation of equity owned prior to the bid, the optimal unbundling strategy reduces post-takeover
incentives to a level commensurate with the initial minority stake, as opposed to a majority stake. In this
case it is open to question what benefits a takeover affords compared to activism. We would argue that these
insights are pertinent to current developments in the market for corporate control.
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Proofs
Proof of Corollary 1
Corollary 1 follows from the equivalence of mixed offers and restricted cash-only offers which the subse-
quent lemma establishes. Consider a bid for r shares that offers a cash price C and t shares in the post-
takeover firm.
Lemma 1. Under full information, the restricted mixed offer (r,C, t) and the restricted cash-only offer
(rco,Cco) with Cco =C and rco = r− t are payoff-equivalent.
Proof. To succeed, the mixed offer must satisfy the free-rider condition C+ tX ≥ rX , or equivalently
C/r+(t/r)X ≥ X . (9)
Given the condition is satisfied, all shareholders tender, and the bidder’s payoff is
Φ(X)+ r [X− (C/r+(t/r)X)] . (10)
Rearranging the free-rider condition (9) to
C ≥ (r− t)X
and the bidder’s payoff (10) to
Φ(X)+(r− t)X−C
shows that the restricted cash-only offer (rco,Cco) with Cco =C and rco = r− t is payoff-equivalent for any
X . 
Proof of Proposition 2
Given that Φ′(·) ≥ 0, we show that there exists a schedule {α(·),r(·),P(·)} with α ′ > 0, r′ ≥ 0 and P′ > 0
that can be supported as a separating equilibrium.
Quasi-concavity. Suppose that the proposed schedule satisfies (3) for Xˆ = X for all X ∈ X . This
schedule then makes the objective function quasi-concave. Specifically, under this schedule,
∂Π/∂ Xˆ = α ′(Xˆ)Φ(X)+ r′(Xˆ)K(Xˆ ;X)+ r(Xˆ)K′(Xˆ ;X)− r′(Xˆ)P(Xˆ)− r(Xˆ)P′(Xˆ) (11)
is non-negative for Xˆ ≤ X and non-positive for X ≥ Xˆ .
For Xˆ = X , the first-order condition (3) becomes
r(Xˆ)P′(Xˆ)+ r′(Xˆ)P(Xˆ) = α ′(Xˆ)Φ(Xˆ)+ r′(Xˆ)K(Xˆ ; Xˆ)+ r(Xˆ)K′(Xˆ ; Xˆ).
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Substituting the right-hand side into (11) and using K(Xˆ ;X) = X + k[1−α(Xˆ)]Φ(X) yields
∂Π/∂ Xˆ = α ′(Xˆ)Φ(X)+ r′(Xˆ)[X + k[1−α(Xˆ)]Φ(X)]− r(Xˆ)kα ′(Xˆ)Φ(X)
−α ′(Xˆ)Φ(Xˆ)− r′(Xˆ)[Xˆ + k[1−α(Xˆ)]Φ(Xˆ)]+ r(Xˆ)kα ′(Xˆ)Φ(Xˆ). (12)
By rearranging, we obtain
∂Π/∂ Xˆ = α ′(Xˆ)
[
Φ(X)−Φ(Xˆ)]− r(Xˆ)kα ′(Xˆ)[Φ(X)−Φ(Xˆ)]
+ r′(Xˆ)k[1−α(Xˆ)][Φ(X)−Φ(Xˆ)]+ r′(Xˆ)[X− Xˆ]
∂Π/∂ Xˆ =
[
[1− r(Xˆ)k]α ′(Xˆ)+ k[1−α(Xˆ)]r′(Xˆ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
[
Φ(X)−Φ(Xˆ)]+ r′(Xˆ)[X− Xˆ] .
The assumption Φ′(·) ≥ 0 implies that Φ(X) ≥ Φ(Xˆ) when Xˆ ≤ X and that Φ(X) ≤ Φ(Xˆ) when Xˆ ≥ X .
Since α ′ > 0 and r′ ≥ 0 and therefore Γ≥ 0 for k = 0 as well as k = 1, it follows that
∂Π/∂ Xˆ is

non-negative for Xˆ < X
0 for Xˆ = X
non-positive for Xˆ > X
.
Thus, the proposed schedule makes Π(Xˆ ;X) weakly quasi-concave overX . This also holds for r′(Xˆ) = 0,
in which case all bidder types propose the same bid restriction.
Local optimality. Condition (3) is a functional equation for α (·), r (·) and P(·) with two degrees
of freedom. To derive an example of an incentive-compatible schedule, we set r (·) = 0.5. Then, using
K(Xˆ ;X) = X + k[1−α(Xˆ)]Φ(X), condition (3) for Xˆ = X simplifies to
0.5P′(Xˆ) = α ′(Xˆ)Φ(X)−0.5[kα ′(Xˆ)Φ(Xˆ)]
α ′(Xˆ) =
P′(Xˆ)
(2− k)Φ(Xˆ)
Integrating on both sides over [X ,X ] yields
ˆ X
X
α ′(u)du =
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
(2− k)Φ(u)du ⇔ α(X)−α(X) =
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
(2− k)Φ(u)du.
As the highest-valued type does not have to relinquish any private benefits [α(X) = 1],
α(X) = 1−
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
(2− k)Φ(u)du. (13)
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Free-rider condition. Equation (13) has one degree of freedom, which we use to select a price function
that satisfies the free-rider condition P(X)≥ K(X ;X) = X + k[1−α(X)]Φ(X).
For k = 0, one such price schedule is P(X) = X . Using this schedule in (13) yields α(X) = 1−´ X
X [2Φ(u)]
−1 du. Clearly, these two schedules satisfy the free-rider condition and the incentive compati-
bility constraint.
For k = 1, consider the price schedule P(X) = X+zX+z X . Using this schedule in (13), and then substituting
the resulting expression for α(X) into the free-rider condition yields
X + z
X + z
X ≥ X +
[
X
X + z
ˆ X
X
1
Φ(u)
du
]
Φ(X).
Collecting the terms with X on the left-hand side yields
(
X
X + z
−1
)
X ≥
[
X
X + z
ˆ X
X
1
Φ(u)
du
]
Φ(X)− X
X/z+1
.
As z→ ∞, the left-hand side converges to −X whereas the right-hand side converges to −X . Consequently,
there exists some z¯ such that, for all z > z¯, both the free-rider condition and the incentive compatibility
constraints are satisfied.
Cut-off type. The condition (3) puts a constraint on how equilibrium profits vary across types in equi-
librium. By the envelope theorem, and using K(X ;X) = X + k[1−α(X)]Φ(X), we have that equilibrium
profits must be increasing at the rate
∂Π(X ;X)/∂X = [α(X)+ k[1−α(X)]r(X)]Φ′(X)+ r(X)
for any schedule that satisfies (3).
Given an equilibrium exists, the cut-off type XcS is given by
ˆ X
XcS
{
[α(u)+ k[1−α(u)]r(u)]Φ′(u)+ r(u)}du =Φ(X). (14)
Under the proposed equilibrium schedule, bidder types below XcS incur a loss under the proposed sched-
ule. Hence, they prefer not making a bid over making the bid prescribed by the proposed schedule. The
option of not making a bid does not undermine the non-mimicking constraints. Under the proposed sched-
ule, the bidder prefers a loss-making offer to offers made by higher-valued types. A fortiori, she also prefers
a zero-profit offer over the latter.
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The proposed schedule can be supported as a separating equilibrium under
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs that any deviation comes from the highest bidder type, X . Under these beliefs,
the target shareholders do not tender their shares in response to a deviation bid (r˜, α˜, P˜) unless P˜≥ X . Any
33
such bid, however, is weakly dominated by
(
0.5,1,X
)
, which is the equilibrium bid of the highest bidder
type. Since
(
0.5,1,X
)
is mimicking-proof, any successful deviation bid is—by implication—unattractive
under the proposed out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Bid restriction. The above separating schedule with r(·) = 0.5 implies that the bid restriction is a
redundant signal. By contrast, the private benefit retention rate α and the price P are indispensable as
signals. First, if α is invariant across types, Proposition 1 applies. Second, a uniform price in a separating
equilibrium must satisfy P = X . But then all bidder types X < X prefer the offer (0.5,1,X), which always
succeeds irrespective of shareholder beliefs, to any other offer with P = X . Hence, they would pool. 
Diversion and controlling stake
Here, we assume that the bidder’s cannot contractually commit not to extract the maximum private benefits
ex post, but that her post-takeover controlling stake affects either her ability or her willingness to extract
private benefits.
Case 1 (Entrenchment). Suppose the bidder’s ability to extract private benefits increases with the size of
her controlling stake such that the maximum fraction φ¯ of total value extracted as private benefits increases
in r. The bidder’s payoff function is then
φ¯(r)V + r[(1− φ¯(r))V −P]
where φ¯ ′(r)> 0.
By defining Φ(V ) ≡ φ¯(1)V , α(r) ≡ φ¯(r)V/Φ(V ), and X ≡ V −Φ(V ), the objective function can be
written
α(r)Φ(V )+ r{X +[1−α(r)]Φ(V )−P}
and the free-rider condition as P ≥ X +[1−α(r)]Φ(V ). This tender offer game is thus isomorphic to our
generic framework with k = 1 and the additional constraint α(r) = r. There exist φ¯(·)such that a separating
equilibrium can be constructed under this additional constraint. One example is α = r, which implies φ¯(r) =
rφ¯(1) where φ¯(1) can be any constant in (0,1]. We show in the context of the merger game discussed in
Section 3.1.4 that this additional constraint, α = r, can be satisfied.
Case 2 (Alignment). Suppose private benefit extraction is costly such that the bidder’s incentives to
extract private benefits decreases with the size of her controlling stake (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1998).
Specifically, suppose the bidder incurs a cost of c(φ) when she extracts a fraction φ of the total value as
private benefits, where c′(·)> 0 and c′′(·)> 0. We proceed by backward induction. Once in control with an
ownership stake r ≥ 0.5, the bidder chooses φ to maximize φV + r(1−φ)V − c(φ), which is concave in φ
due to c′′(·)> 0. The optimal extraction rate φ ∗ = φ ∗(r,V ) solves the first-order condition c′(φ ∗) = (1−r)V .
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At the time of the tender offer, the bidder hence solves the problem
max
r,P
φ ∗(r,V )V + r[(1−φ ∗(r,V ))V −P]− c(φ ∗(r,V )),
which can be written as
max
Vˆ
φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),V )V + r(Vˆ ){[1−φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),V )]V −P(Vˆ )}− c(φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),V )).
The first-order derivative of this objective function is
∂φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),V )
∂ r
r′(Vˆ )V + r′(Vˆ )V −φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),V )r′(Vˆ )V − r(Vˆ )∂φ
∗(r(Vˆ ),V )
∂ r
r′(Vˆ )V
− r′(Vˆ )P(Vˆ )− r(Vˆ )P′(Vˆ )− [1− r(Vˆ )]∂φ
∗(r(Vˆ ),V )
∂ r
r′(Vˆ )V (15)
where we use the first-order condition c′(φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),V )) = [1− r(Vˆ )]V from the bidder’s private benefit ex-
traction problem. This can be simplified to
[1−φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),V )]r′(Vˆ )V − r′(Vˆ )P(Vˆ )− r(Vˆ )P′(Vˆ ).
We now show that any r(·)-schedule that satisfies the first-order condition renders the bidder’s optimization
quasi-convex, and hence violates the sufficient condition for a maximum.
First-order condition. In a separating equilibrium, (15) equals zero for Vˆ =V for all V , which can then
be written
0 = r′(Vˆ )
{
P(Vˆ )− [1−φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),Vˆ )]Vˆ}+ r(Vˆ )P′(Vˆ ). (16)
In a separating equilibrium, lower-valued types reveal their type so as to pay a lower price; that is, P′(Vˆ )> 0.
Further, by the free-rider condition, P(Vˆ )− [1−φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),Vˆ )]Vˆ ≥ 0. Thus, a necessary condition for (16) to
be satisfied is that r′(Vˆ )< 0.
Quasi-convexity. Substituting for r′(Vˆ )P(Vˆ ) + r(Vˆ )P′(Vˆ ) in (15) by using (16) gives the first-order
derivative [
1−φ ∗(r(Vˆ ),V )]r′(Vˆ )(V −Vˆ) (17)
For r′(Vˆ ) < 0, this derivative is non-positive for all Vˆ < V and non-negative for all Vˆ > V . This means
that, for any r(·) such that (16) can be satisfied, the bidder’s objective function is quasi-convex, and the
solution to (16) identifies a global minimum. Thus, there exists no separating offer schedule in this case. We
conclude with two remarks. First, Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998) choose a cost function of the form
c(φ) = `(φ)V , which the above analysis encompasses. Second, unlike in the other tender offer games studied
in this paper, here the offer schedule affects the total takeover surplus (not just the division of surplus). This
makes it more attractive for high types to profit from mimicking low types as opposed to extracting (more)
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private benefits, which undermines separation.
Mergers and probabilistic outcomes
As argued in the text, we can map the merger model into the generic framework with k= 0 and the additional
constraint r = γα . For the sake of completeness, we show that a separating equilibrium can be constructed
under this additional constraint.
The first-order condition (3) with k = 0 and r = γα is
γα(Xˆ)P′(Xˆ)+ γα ′(Xˆ)P(Xˆ) = α ′(Xˆ)Φ(X)+ γα ′(Xˆ)X
P′(Xˆ) =
α ′(Xˆ)
α(Xˆ)
[
1
γ
Φ(X)+X−P(Xˆ)
]
.
In a separating equilibrium, this condition holds for Xˆ = X . Further choosing the price schedule P = X to
satisfy the free-rider condition and inserting it into the first-order condition yields a differential equation for
α(·):
γ
Φ(X)
=
α ′(X)
α(X)
.
Integrating on both sides yields
ˆ X
X
γ
Φ(u)
du = lnα(X)− lnα(X)
α(X) = exp
[
−
ˆ X
X
γ
Φ(u)
du
]
which is increasing in X .
Proof of Proposition 3
By definition, every X ∈X(rP,αP,PP) satisfies the participation constraint (4). Define the posterior belief func-
tion g(rP,αP,PP) ≡ E[K(αP,X)|X ∈X(rP,αP,PP)]. Note that g(rP,αP,0) = E[K(αP,X)] > 0, which means
that the free-rider condition is violated for PP = 0. In contrast, g(rP,αP,K(αP,X))=E[K(αP,X)|K(αP,X)≥
K(αP,X)−αPΦ(X)/rP)]≤K(αP,X), which means that the free-rider condition is satisfied for PP =K(αP,X).
Hence, for any rP and αP, there exists a set of pricesP(rP,αP)⊂ (0,K(αP,X)] which satisfy the free-rider
condition.
In addition to satisfying the free-rider condition, a pooling equilibrium offer (rP,αP,PP) must yield at
least as high (positive) profits as any alternative bid (r′,α ′,P′). Any bid (r′,α ′,P′) with P′ < K(α ′,X) can
be made to fail by choosing shareholders’ off-equilibrium beliefs E[K(α ′,X) |(r′,α ′,P′) ] = K(α ′,X), and
can hence be ruled out as a profitable deviation. All bids (r′,α ′,P′) with P′ ≥ K(α ′,X) always succeed,
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irrespective of shareholders’ off-equilibrium beliefs. Among these offers, the least costly, and hence most
profitable, one is (0.5,1,K(1,X)). Hence, only offers that belong to some P(rP,αP) and also satisfy the
condition
max{αPΦ(X)+ rP[K(αP,X)−PP],0} ≥
Φ(X)+0.5[K(1,X)−K(1,X)] =Φ(X)+0.5(X−X) (18)
for all X ∈X can be supported as Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. Such offers do exist: Consider some price
Pˆ ∈P(0.5,1). We know that Pˆ≤ K(1,X) = X . Thus, using (rP,αP,PP) = (0.5,1, Pˆ) in (18) yields
max{Φ(X)+0.5(X− Pˆ),0} ≥Φ(X)+0.5(X−X),
which holds. 
Partially separating equilibria with multiple pooling prices
Consider the discontinuous private benefit function
Φ(X) =
{
Φ for X ∈ [0,A)
Φ for X ∈ [A,X ]
with Φ> Φ> 0. We want to construct an equilibrium in which all types in [X1,A)⊆ [0,A) offer a uniform
contract (r,α,P), and all types in [A,X ] offer a uniform contract
(
r,α,P
)
. The two pooling offers (r,α,P)
and
(
r,α,P
)
must satisfy the following incentive compatibility, participation, and free-rider constraints:
incentive compatibility constraints. In [0,A), higher types have a stronger incentive to deviate to(
r,α,P
)
. Similarly, of all types in [A,X ], type A has the strongest incentive to deviate to (r,α,P). Hence, if
(r,α,P) and
(
r,α,P
)
satisfy the constraints
αΦ+ r(A−P)≥ αΦ+ r(A−P)
αΦ+ r(A−P)≤ αΦ+ r(A−P) ,
or equivalently,
r(A−P)− r(A−P)≥ (α−α)Φ
r(A−P)− r(A−P)≤ (α−α)Φ , (IC)
they satisfy the non-mimicking constraints of all types in [0,A) and [A,X ].
Participation constraints. Of all types in [X1,A), type 0 gets the smallest payoff from (r,α,P). Simi-
larly, of all types in the [A,X ], type A gets the smallest payoff from
(
r,α,P
)
. Hence, if (r,α,P) and
(
r,α,P
)
,
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respectively, satisfy the participation constraints
αΦ+ r(X1−P) = 0
αΦ+ r(A−P)≥ 0 , (PC)
they satisfy the participation constraints of all types in [X1,A) and [A,X ]. Note that A’s participation con-
straint is implied by her incentive compatibility constraint. Note also that, if X1’s participation constraint
binds, all types below X1 prefer not to make a bid.
Free-rider conditions. Assuming k = 0 for this example, the free-rider conditions are
P≥ E[X |X ∈ [X1,A) ]
P≥ E[X ∣∣X ∈ [A,X ] ] . (FR)
Equilibrium values. Together, (IC), (PC), and (FR) comprise a system of five equations with six un-
knowns. It is straightforward to construct an example: First, choose admissible values for (r,α,P) and(
r,α,P
)
with P ∈ [0,A) and P ∈ [A,X ]. to satisfy (IC), which is possible given that Φ > Φ > 0. Next,
choose a type X1 to satisfy (PC). Finally, choose a distribution of types within each interval such that (FR)
is satisfied.
By means of illustration, here is a numeric example that satisfies all constraints: X = 9, A = 5, Φ = 6,
Φ= 2, (r,α,P) = (0.5,0.5,3),
(
r,α,P
)
= (1,1,7), X1 = 1, and types are uniformly distributed on [1,5) and
on [5,9].
Comparison to equilibrium with single pooling offer. Whether the above equilibrium is more or less
efficient than equilibria with a single pooling offer depends on the type distribution G. Define the conditional
distributions G(x) = Pr [X ≤ x |X ∈ [X1,A) ] and G(x) = Pr
[
X ≤ x ∣∣X ∈ [A,X ]]. By means of illustration,
consider shifts in probability mass between
[
A,X
]
and [0,A) that affect the overall distribution G but do not
change the conditional distributions G and G. Such a shift changes E(X), but neither E[X |X ∈ [X1,A) ] nor
E[X
∣∣X ∈ [A,X ] ]. If so, the above equilibrium continues to be supported by the same contracts (r,α,P) and(
r,α,P
)
, since they still satisfy (IC), (PC), and (FR). But as E(X) changes, equilibria with a single pooling
price can become more or less efficient. In our numeric example, consider changes in the overall distribution
that vary E(X) but leave the distributions within [1,5) and [5,9] uniform. For any such shift, the above
equilibrium continues to exist. In an equilibrium with the single pooling offer (rP,αP,PP) = (0.5,1,E(X)),
the cut-off type is determined by the participation constraint
αPΦ+ rP [XcP−E(X)]≥ 0,
which yields XcP = max{0,4−E(X)}. Depending on E(X), this equilibrium can be less or more efficient
than the equilibrium with two pooling offers, since XcP can be larger or smaller than X1 = 1.
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Proof of Proposition 5
In any pooling equilibrium, there exists a subsetX(rP,αP,PP) of types that are active and make the same offer
(rP,αP,PP), which satisfies the free-rider condition PP ≥ E[K(αP,X)|X ∈X(rP,αP,PP)]. Denote the lowest
type in that subset by Xα ≡minX(rP,αP,PP). Clearly, PP > K(αP,X)≥ X .
Consider the offer (rP,αd ,Pd), with αd = αP− δ . A given type X prefers this offer over the pooling
offer if and only if
αdΦ(X)+ rP
[
K(αd ,X)−Pd
]
> αPΦ(X)+ rP [K(αP,X)−PP]
rPPP− rPPd >
(
αP−αd
)
Φ(X)+ rP
[
K(αP,X)−K(αd ,X)
]
.
For k = 0,
rPPP− rPPd > δΦ(X).
For k = 1,
rPPP− rPPd > (1− rP)δΦ(X).
The right-hand side of the inequality is increasing in X for Φ′(·) > 0. Thus, if the inequality binds for
some type X ′, then it holds for all and only types (weakly) lower than X ′. Hence, we can choose Pd such
that the inequality holds for all and only types (weakly) lower than Xα . For very small δ , this requires a
very small decrease in Pd such that Pd ≥ K(αd ,Xα). Under the intuitive criterion, the target shareholders
assign the deviation offer to types X ≤ Xα . Given Pd ≥ K(αd ,Xα), the shareholders therefore never reject
the deviation offer. This argument is applicable so long as αP > 0. Thus, any equilibrium with two types
making the same offer does not survive the intuitive criterion. That is, the only pooling equilibrium that
survives is the degenerate outcome in which only the highest bidder type makes a bid with αP = 0 and
PP = K(0,X).
If Φ′(X) = 0 over some interval of X , lower types cannot use deviations to a lower α to separate them-
selves. An alternative is to deviate to a lower bid restriction r or to an offer that has a smaller success
probability q. While the former option is exhausted at rP = 0.5, reducing the success probability is always
available except in the degenerate case of qP = 0. Consider a probabilistic pooling equilibrium (rP,qP,PP).
Denote the lowest type that makes this offer by Xq ≡ minX(rP,qP,PP) < PP. A deviation offer (rP,qd ,Pd)
with qd = qP−δ is preferred by type X if and only if
qd
[
Φ(X)+ rP(X−Pd)
]
> qP [Φ(X)+ rP (X−PP)]
qPrPPP−qdrPPd >
(
qP−qd
)
[Φ(X)+ rPX ] .
The right-hand side of the inequality is increasing in X . Thus, if the inequality binds for some type X ′, then
it holds for all and only types (weakly) lower than X ′. Hence, we can choose Pd such that the inequality
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holds for all and only types (weakly) lower than Xq. For very small δ , this requires a very small decrease
in Pd such that Pd ≥ Xq. Under the intuitive criterion, the target shareholders assign the deviation offer to
types X ≤ Xq, and since Pd ≥ Xq, the shareholders accept the deviation offer. 
Proof of Proposition 6
For expositional convenience, we characterize the tender offer terms by the triple (r,α,M) where M ≡ rP.
Consider the type (X ,Φ) and an arbitrary type (X ,Φ) 6= (X ,Φ). In any fully revealing equilibrium, type
(X ,Φ) cannot be held to a profit lower than Φ because she can always succeed with the bid (r,1,rX). At
the same time, she cannot earn more than Φ because of the free-rider condition. In order for type (X ,Φ)
not to mimic type (X ,Φ), the latter type must make an offer (r,α,M) which satisfies Φ≥ rX +αΦ−M, or
equivalently
M ≥M ≡ rX− (1−α)Φ. (19)
In addition, a truthful offer by (X ,Φ) must also yield a higher profit than the “out-of-equilibrium” offer(
0.5,1,0.5X
)
which succeeds irrespective of target shareholder beliefs. That is, her offer (r,α,M) must
satisfy rX +αΦ−M ≥ 0.5(X−X)+Φ, or equivalently
M ≤M ≡ (r−0.5)X +0.5X− (1−α)Φ. (20)
The constraints (19) and (20) can be simultaneously satisfied if M≥M holds. Straightforward manipulations
yield (r−0.5)(X−X) ≥ (1−α)(Φ−Φ). The left-hand side is non-positive, whereas the right-hand side
is non-negative. In fact, this condition is violated unless all types with X < X offer r = 0.5 and α = 1, in
which case the condition holds with equality. Furthermore, since types that choose the same r and α cannot
be separated on the basis of the cash price, satisfying the condition requires that all types with X < X make
the same offer (0.5,1,M). 
Proof of Corollary 2
We reenter the proof of Proposition 2 right after the part that establishes quasi-concavity.
Local optimality. Instead of setting r (·) = 0.5, we consider an arbitrary but constant bid restriction
r (·) = r. Using K(Xˆ ;X) = X + k[1−α(Xˆ)]Φ(X), the first-order condition (3) for Xˆ = X simplifies to
rP′(Xˆ) = α ′(Xˆ)Φ(X)− r[kα ′(Xˆ)Φ(Xˆ)]
α ′(Xˆ) =
P′(Xˆ)
(1/r− k)Φ(Xˆ)
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Integrating on both sides over [X ,X ] yields
ˆ X
X
α ′(u)du =
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
(1/r− k)Φ(u)du ⇔ α(X)−α(X) =
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
(1/r− k)Φ(u)du.
As the highest-valued type does not have to relinquish any private benefits [α(X) = 1],
α(X) = 1−
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
(1/r− k)Φ(u)du. (21)
Taking the derivative with respect to r yields
∂α(X)
∂ r
=− 1
(1− rk)2
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
Φ(u)
du< 0
for all X since (as can be easily shown) P′(·) ≥ 0. That is, the fraction of private benefits the bidder must
relinquish in a separating equilibrium is strictly higher for every type, the larger the fraction of shares the
bidder must buy.
It is straightforward to show that the next part in the proof of Proposition 2 on the free-rider condition
applies, with the appropriate minor modifications, analogously to the case of r (·) = r. For brevity, we skip
to the part that analyzes the cut-off type.
Cut-off type. By the envelope theorem, and using K(X ;X) = X + k[1− α(X)]Φ(X), we have that
equilibrium profits must be increasing at the rate
∂Π(X ;X)/∂X =
 [α(X)+ r]Φ′(X)+ r[α(X)− rα(X)+ r]Φ′(X)+ r for k = 0for k = 1
for any schedule that satisfies (3).
For k = 0, we immediately see that the slope ∂Π(X ;X)/∂X is increasing in r for all X . With the highest
type’s profit fixed at Φ(X), this implies that the cut-off type is higher when r is larger.
For k = 1, substituting in (21), we get
∂ 2Π(X ;X)
∂X∂ r
=
∂
∂ r
{
[α(X)− rα(X)+ r]Φ′(X)+ r}
=
∂
∂ r
{[
1− r
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
Φ(u)
du
]
Φ′(X)+ r
}
= 1−Φ′(X)
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
Φ(u)
du. (22)
To make the same argument as for k = 0, we want to show that (or when) this is positive. Compare (22) to
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(21) for k = 1,
α(X) = 1− r
1− r
ˆ X
X
P′(u)
Φ(u)
du,
which is positive for all types that make a bid in equilibrium. This implies that (22) is positive for all X if
Φ′(X)<
r
1− r .
For r ∈ [0.5,1], r1−r ∈ [1,∞], in which case the last inequality is implied by Φ′(X)< 1.
Stochastic security benefits and signaling with derivatives
Let X ∈ [0,+∞) be a random variable. Suppose that there are n bidder types θ ∈ Θ ≡ {1,2, . . . ,n}, each
knowing the probability density function fθ (X) of her post-takeover cash flows. In addition, assume that the
family of densities { fθ (X)}θ∈Θ satisfies the strong monotone likelihood ratio property (SMLRP). That is,
for all θ ′ > θ , fθ ′(X)/ fθ (X) is strictly increasing.
To construct a separating equilibrium, we allow the bidder to pay cash and issue bonds and a cash-settled
“knock-in” call option. This is a latent call option with an exercise price of S that becomes activated only
once the security benefits X exceeds some “trigger” level T > S. To simplify the exposition, we further
assume that Φ= 0.
Proposition 10. In the tender offer game with stochastic post-takeover security benefits, a separating equi-
librium exists if SMLRP holds. All bidder types make a bid and purchase the target shares for a combination
of cash, bonds and knock-in call options.
The equilibrium offer in Proposition 10 provides target shareholders with both “upside participation” and
“downside protection”. The bidder primarily wants to signal a low value. To this end, she issues knock-in
options that transfer some high cash flow realizations to the target shareholders. However, the use of knock-
in options makes the bidder prone to being mimicked by (even) lower-valued types. To remove doubts about
the value of the offered options, she must include bonds to separate herself from lower-valued types. Thus,
the bidder’s need to separate herself from lower-valued types through offering downside protection derives
endogenously from the bidder’s primary intention to distinguish herself from higher-valued types by offering
upside participation.
Proof. We first establish the following two auxiliary results.
Lemma 2. For all θ ′ > θ , there exists a unique Xθ (θ ′) ∈ (0,∞) s.t.
fθ (X)
{
> fθ ′ (X) for all X < Xθ (θ ′)
< fθ ′ (X) for all X > Xθ (θ ′)
.
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Proof. By SMLRP, for all θ ′ > θ , there is a unique Xθ (θ ′) ∈ (0,∞) s.t.
fθ ′(X)/ fθ (X)

< 1 for X < Xθ (θ ′)
= 1 for X ∈X (θ ,θ ′)
> 1 for X > Xθ (θ ′)
.
Otherwise, if fθ ′(X)/ fθ (X) is either always larger or always smaller than 1, it cannot be that Fθ (∞)=Fθ ′(∞).
This implies the result.
Lemma 3. For all θ ′′ > θ ′ > θ , Xθ ′(θ ′′)≥ Xθ (θ ′).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that
Xθ ′(θ ′′)< Xθ (θ ′). (F)
By Lemma 2, it then follows that
(a) For X ∈ (0,Xθ ′(θ ′′)) : fθ ′′ (X)fθ ′ (X) < 1 and
fθ ′ (X)
fθ (X)
< 1⇒ fθ ′′ (X)fθ (X) < 1
(b) For X = Xθ ′(θ ′′):
fθ ′′ (X)
fθ ′ (X)
= 1 and fθ ′ (X)fθ (X) < 1⇒
fθ ′′ (X)
fθ (X)
< 1
(c) For X ∈ (Xθ ′(θ ′′),Xθ (θ ′)) : fθ ′′ (X)fθ ′ (X) > 1 and
fθ ′ (X)
fθ (X)
< 1⇒ fθ ′′ (X)fθ (X) ≷ 1
(d) For X = Xθ (θ ′):
fθ ′′ (X)
fθ ′ (X)
> 1 and fθ ′ (X)fθ (X) = 1⇒
fθ ′′ (X)
fθ (X)
> 1
(e) For X ∈ (Xθ (θ ′),∞) : fθ ′′ (X)fθ ′ (X) > 1 and
fθ ′ (X)
fθ (X)
> 1⇒ fθ ′′ (X)fθ (X) > 1
Observe that (i) fθ ′′(X) = fθ ′(X) for X = Xθ ′(θ ′′) and (ii) fθ ′(X) = fθ (X) for X = Xθ (θ ′). SMLRP implies
that fθ ′′(X)/ fθ (X)≤ 1 in case (c), and hence that (iii) fθ ′′(X) = fθ (X) for X = Xθ (θ ′). Points (ii) and (iii)
together imply that (iv) fθ ′′(X) = fθ ′(X) for X = Xθ (θ ′). Given that fθ ′′(X) > fθ ′(X) in case (c), points
(iv) and (i) can only be reconciled with SMLRP if Xθ ′(θ ′′) = Xθ (θ ′). However, this contradicts inequality
(F).
Main proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we compare adjacent types and analyze
local incentive compatibility. In the second step, we show that an offer which is locally mimicking-proof is
also globally mimicking-proof.
Local incentive compatibility. Consider a type θ who, for each target share, offers a cash price Pθ , a
debt claim with face value D, and a (cash-settled) knock-in call option with exercise price Sθ and trigger
level Tθ .
Absent private benefits, a fully efficient equilibrium requires that the bidder’s cash price is weakly lower
than the expected value of the cash flow rights that she acquires. At the same time, the free-rider condition
requires that the cash price is weakly higher than the expected value of the transferred cash flow rights. Both
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constraints can only be satisfied simultaneously if they are both binding:
Pθ =
ˆ Tθ
D
(X−D) fθ (X)dX +
ˆ ∞
Tθ
(Sθ −D)+ fθ (X)dX .
Consequently, every truthful offer must yield zero bidder profits.
(i) The next higher type θ +1 does not mimic θ iff
−Pθ +
ˆ Tθ
D
(X−D) fθ+1(X)dX +
ˆ ∞
Tθ
(Sθ −D)+ fθ+1(X)dX ≤ 0.
Substituting for Pθ , the inequality can be written as
(Sθ −D)+
ˆ ∞
Tθ
[ fθ+1(X)− fθ (X)]dX ≤
ˆ Tθ
D
[ fθ (X)− fθ+1(X)] (X−D)dX . (23)
Set Tθ = Xθ (θ + 1). By Lemma 2, both integrals are then strictly positive for any D < Tθ = Xθ (θ + 1), in
which case there exists a Sθ > 0 such that (23) is satisfied.
(ii) Analogously, the next lower type θ −1 does not mimic θ iff
(Sθ −D)+
ˆ ∞
Tθ
[ fθ−1(X)− fθ (X)]dX ≤
ˆ Tθ
D
[ fθ (X)− fθ−1(X)] (X−D)dX . (24)
Set D= Xθ−1(θ). By Lemma 2, the right-hand side is then strictly positive. By Lemma 3, Tθ = Xθ (θ+1)≥
Xθ−1(θ) so that the left-hand side integral is strictly negative. So, (24) holds.
Global incentive compatibility. We now consider in turn types higher than θ + 1 and types lower than
θ −1.
(i) Given Tθ = Xθ (θ + 1) and D = Xθ−1(θ), consider now the incentive compatibility constraint of an
arbitrary type θ+ > θ +1 vis-à-vis type θ :
[Sθ −Xθ−1(θ)]+
ˆ ∞
Xθ (θ+1)
[ fθ+(X)− fθ (X)]dX ≤
ˆ Xθ (θ+1)
Xθ−1(θ)
[ fθ (X)− fθ+(X)] [X−Xθ−1(θ)]dX .
Defining η(X)≡ fθ+1(X)− fθ+(X), write the inequality as
[Sθ −Xθ−1(θ)]+
ˆ ∞
Xθ (θ+1)
[ fθ+1(X)− fθ (X)−η(X)]dX ≤
ˆ Xθ (θ+1)
Xθ−1(θ)
[ fθ (X)− fθ+1(X)+η(X)] [X−Xθ−1(θ)]dX . (25)
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By Lemma 3, Xθ+1(θ+)≥Xθ (θ+1) so that η(X)> 0 for all X <Xθ (θ+1). This implies that the right-hand
side of (25) is larger than the right-hand side of (23), and hence strictly positive. Turning to the left-hand
side, because
−
ˆ ∞
Xθ (θ+1)
η(X)dX =
ˆ Xθ (θ+1)
0
η(X)dX−
ˆ ∞
0
η(X)dX =
ˆ Xθ (θ+1)
0
η(X)dX > 0,
the integral on the left-hand side of (25) is larger than the integral on the left-hand side of (23), and hence
strictly positive. We conclude that—for Tθ = Xθ (θ + 1) and D = Xθ−1(θ)—there exists a strictly positive
price, Sθ > 0, such that no type θ+ > θ mimics type θ .
(ii) Given Tθ = Xθ (θ +1) and D = Xθ−1(θ), consider now the incentive compatibility constraint of an
arbitrary type θ− < θ −1 vis-à-vis type θ :
[Sθ −Xθ−1(θ)]+
ˆ ∞
Xθ (θ+1)
[ fθ−(X)− fθ (X)]dX ≤
ˆ Xθ (θ+1)
Xθ−1(θ)
[ fθ (X)− fθ−(X)] [X−Xθ−1(θ)]dX .
Defining ζ (X)≡ fθ−1(X)− fθ−(X), write the inequality as
[Sθ −Xθ−1(θ)]+
ˆ ∞
Xθ (θ+1)
[ fθ−1(X)− fθ (X)−ζ (X)]dX ≤
ˆ Xθ (θ+1)
Xθ−1(θ)
[ fθ (X)− fθ−1(X)+ζ (X)] [X−Xθ−1(θ)]dX . (26)
By Lemma 3, Xθ−1(θ)≥ Xθ−(θ −1) so that ζ (X)> 0 for all X > Xθ−1(θ). This implies that the right-hand
side of (26) is larger than the right-hand side of (24), and hence strictly positive. Turning to the left-hand
side, again by Lemma 3, Xθ (θ +1)≥ Xθ−1(θ)≥ Xθ−(θ −1) so that ζ (X)> 0 for all X > Xθ (θ +1). This
implies that the left-hand side integral of (26) is smaller than the left-hand side integral of (24), and hence
strictly negative. So, (26) holds. We conclude that—for Tθ = Xθ (θ + 1), D = Xθ−1(θ), and Sθ > 0—no
type θ− < θ mimics type θ . 
Proof of Proposition 8
We first derive the optimal bid in a modified setting in which the bidder can commit to an effort level prior
to being in control, and then show that the same outcome obtains in a setting without such commitment.
Setting with commitment. Suppose the bidder can choose both C and e to maximize her payoff
Π(C ,e) = βB(e;θ)−C(e)+ rK(e;θ)− rP− rS (e,θ)
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subject to non-mimicking constraints and the free-rider condition. For any chosen e, r, and β , her payoff
is maximized by P and S that minimize the overall payment and thus make the free-rider condition bind.
A cash price P = K(e;θ) and a call option with strike price S = P achieve this. Because this offer is also
mimicking-proof (Proposition 7), it is accepted by shareholders. This reduces the bidder’s payoff to her net
private benefits Φˆ(e;θ) = βB(e;θ)−C(e). The first-order condition
β
∂B(e;θ)
∂e
=
∂C(e)
∂e
pins e down as a function of β and θ : e(β ,θ). By the envelope theorem,
∂ Φˆ(β ,e(β ,θ))
∂β
= B(e(β ,θ);θ)> 0.
So, the bidder optimally chooses β ∗ = 1 and e∗ = e(1,θ), which is the solution to (7).
Setting without commitment. The original problem differs only in that it has the additional constraint
(8). The above outcome hence remains optimal if it is feasible. This is indeed the case because the contract
C ∗ = (1,r,K(e∗;θ),S ∗) whereS ∗ is a call option with strike price S∗ = K(e∗;θ) induces e∗ = e(1,0) also
in the absence of commitment.
Consider the incentive constraint (8) under C ∗. For e≤ e∗, the call option is worthless, and the first-order
derivative of the objective function under C ∗ with respect to e is
∂B(e;θ)
∂e
− ∂C(e)
∂e
+ r
∂K(e;θ)
∂e
. (27)
Given e∗ satisfies (7), the difference between the first two terms is positive for e ≤ e∗, and (27) is hence
strictly positive (i.e., the bidder wants to strictly increase e) as long as e ≤ e∗. For e ≥ e∗, the call options
are worth rS (e;θ) = r [K(e;θ)−K(e∗;θ)] , making (8) identical to (7), yielding e∗ as the solution. 
Proof of Proposition 9
We first establish sufficient conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists. Afterwards, we discuss
the countervailing effects that unbundling has on post-takeover effort. Last, we provide a toehold example.
Preliminaries. In the contracting environment of Section 3 (S = 0), bid restrictions are redundant for
signaling. Hence, we can fix r = r. Denote the bidder’s payoff under optimal effort, or value function, as
W (β ,P)≡max
e
βB(e;θ)−C(e)+ rK(e;θ)− rP = βB(e(β ,θ);θ)−C(e(β ,θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(β ;θ)
+ r K(e(β ,θ);θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
K (β ;θ)
− rP
whereB(β ;θ) andK (β ;θ) are net private benefits and security benefits under optimal effort as a function
of β and θ . The optimal effort e(β ,θ) is implicitly defined by the first-order condition (8). Since B, X , and
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C are twice continuously differentiable,B(β ;θ), andK (β ;θ) are twice continuously differentiable.
We first establish an auxiliary result regardingK (β ;θ).
Lemma 4. Security benefits under optimal effortK (β ;θ) are increasing in θ .
Proof. First, we show that
• Be,Xe ≥ 0 with at least one strict inequality
• Beθ ,Xeθ ≥ 0
• Bee,Xee ≤ 0.
Since, by assumption, ∂B∂X ≥ 0, ∂V∂B and ∂V∂X must have the same sign. Further, given X + kB = V and
hence ∂X∂V +k
∂B
∂V = 1,
∂B
∂V and
∂X
∂V must both be positive, and at least one strictly so. The same is then true for
Be = ∂B∂V Ve and Xe =
∂X
∂V Ve since Ve > 0. Similarly, since Veθ ≥ 0, Vee ≤ 0, Vθ > 0, we have Beθ = ∂B∂V Veθ ≥ 0,
Xeθ = ∂X∂V Veθ ≥ 0, Bee = ∂B∂V Vee ≤ 0, Xee = ∂X∂V Vee ≤ 0, Bθ = ∂B∂V Vθ > 0, and Xθ = ∂X∂V Vθ > 0.
Second, writing out K, the bidder’s objective function is
βB(e;θ)−C(e)+ r [X(e;θ)+(1−β )kB(e;θ)]− rP,
and the first-order condition with respect to effort is
[β + r (1−β )k]Be+ rXe−Ce = 0.
The solution e∗, by the implicit function theorem, satisfies the partial derivative
∂e
∂θ
=− [β + r (1−β )k]Beθ + rXeθ
[β + r (1−β )k]Bee+ rXee−Cee ≥ 0.
The inequality follows from the first step and Cee > 0.
Third, from the definitionK (β ;θ) = X(e(β ,θ);θ)+(1−β )kB(e(β ,θ);θ), it follows that
∂K (β ;θ)
∂θ
= Xθ +Xe
∂e
∂θ
+(1−β )k
[
Bθ +Be
∂e
∂θ
]
As shown in the first step, all terms on the right-hand side are positive, and Bθ and Xθ are strictly so.
We now return attention to the contract choice. At the time of the tender offer, the bidder maximizes the
value function W with respect to β and P subject to the free-rider condition (and shareholder beliefs). To
construct a separating equilibrium, reformulate the bidder’s problem as a direct mechanism:
max
θˆ
B(β (θˆ);θ)+ rK (β (θˆ);θ)− rP(θˆ)
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subject to the free-rider condition
P(θˆ)≥K (β (θˆ); θˆ),
where θˆ (θ ) is the bidder’s reported (true) type. Assuming a price schedule P(·) under which the free-rider
condition is binding, the problem can be written as
max
θˆ
B(β (θˆ);θ)+ rK (β (θˆ);θ)− rK (β (θˆ); θˆ)
Note that the last two terms do not cancel.
Local optimality. Full revelation requires a schedule β (·) such that the first-order condition
∂B(β (θˆ);θ)
∂β
β ′(θˆ)+ r
∂K (β (θˆ);θ)
∂β
β ′(θˆ)− r∂K (β (θˆ); θˆ)
∂β
β ′(θˆ)− r∂K (β (θˆ ; θˆ)
∂ θˆ
= 0
is satisfied at θˆ = θ for every θ , which is the case when
∂B(β (θ);θ)
∂β
β ′(θ) = r
∂K (β (θ);θ)
∂θ
. (28)
Since ∂K (β ;θ)∂θ > 0 (Lemma 4), this can only hold if the derivatives on the left-hand side have the same sign.
The solution β (·) must also satisfy monotonicity and the boundary condition β (θ) = 1. Hence, β ′(θ) > 0
and ∂B(β (θ);θ)∂β > 0 for all θ . That is, under the separating schedule, higher types retain a larger fraction of
their gross private benefits, and every type must on the margin gain if it could retain more of its gross private
benefits. Moreover, higher types exert more effort not only because they are more productive (see the second
step in the proof of Lemma 4) but also because r(θ) = r and β ′(θ) > 0. As a result, higher types generate
greater baseline security benefits X .32
Rewrite the differential equation (28) as
β ′ = r
∂K (β ,θ)
∂θ
∂B(β ,θ)
∂β
≡ F(β ,θ).
WithB(β ;θ) andK (β ;θ) twice continuously differentiable, and hence F(β ,θ) and Fβ (β ,θ) continuous
in (0,1]×Θ, there exists a unique solution pinned down by the boundary condition β (θ) = 1 (cf. Sydsaeter
et al., 2008, p. 217).33
32Note that the first-order condition does not require baseline net private benefitsB(β ;θ) to be increasing in θ for a given β . This
is useful because such a condition is not necessarily easy to satisfy, since the basic “overworking” problem created by the interaction
between moral hazard and the free-rider problem can be worse for higher types. However, note that at the same time this does not
preclude thatB(β ;θ) is increasing under the equilibrium schedule.
33The restriction to β ∈ (0,1] is inconsequential as Φ(β ,θ) = 0 implies β > 0 for all θ . That is, any bid that confers non-negative
profits on the bidder must have β > 0.
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Quasi-concavity. The first-order derivative of the bidder’s objective under the direct mechanism is
∂W
∂ θˆ
=
∂B(β (θˆ);θ)
∂β
β ′(θˆ)+ r
∂K (β (θˆ);θ)
∂β
β ′(θˆ)− r∂K (β (θˆ); θˆ)
∂β
β ′(θˆ)− r∂K (β (θˆ); θˆ)
∂ θˆ
.
Using (28) to substitute for the last term and rearranging yields
∂W
∂ θˆ
= β ′(θˆ)
[
∂B(β (θˆ);θ)
∂β
− ∂B(β (θˆ); θˆ)
∂β
]
+ rβ ′(θˆ)
[
∂K (β (θˆ);θ)
∂β
− ∂K (β (θˆ); θˆ)
∂β
]
. (29)
If the private benefits retention rate and productivity are “complements” in inducing the bidder to generate
net private benefits and security benefits, i.e., if
∂ 2B(β ;θ)
∂β∂θ
,
∂ 2K (β ;θ)
∂β∂θ
≥ 0,
then the bracketed terms in (29) are non-negative for θˆ < θ and non-positive for θˆ > θ , thus rendering the
bidder’s objective function (weakly) quasi-concave in θˆ . Note that these conditions pertain to values created
under optimal effort, and (at least) not (directly) to the relationship between effort and productivity in the
production technology.
Equilibrium multiplicity. Provided the conditions for quasi-concavity are met, separating equilibria can
be supported for multiple r. Also, there may exist separating equilibria with non-uniform bid restrictions.
Toehold example(s). In the case of toeholds, we have k = 0
B(e;θ) = tV (e;θ)
X(e;θ) = V (e;θ) = K(e;θ)
where V (e;θ) denotes gross firm value. The incentive constraint (8) without unbundling becomes
β t
∂V (e;θ)
∂e
+ r
∂V (e;θ)
∂e
=
∂C(e)
∂e
,
and the incentive constraint (7) with optimal unbundling becomes
t
∂V (e;θ)
∂e
=
∂C(e)
∂e
.
A comparison between these two constraints immediately reveals that effort must be lower in the second one
because β t+ r ≥ .5> t. This is true independent of (further assumptions on) the production technology and
regardless of whether the equilibrium is pooling or separating. For examples in which separating equilibria
exist, we must put more structure on the production technology.
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Example 1: Marginal return to effort increasing in bidder type. Assume
V (e;θ) = θe+V
C(e) =
c
2
e2.
Fixing r = r, the bidder maximizes β t (θe+V )− c2 e2+ r (θe+V )− rP. Her optimal effort is given by
e(β ,θ) = (β t+ r)
θ
c
so that
B(β ;θ) = β tV (e(β ,θ);θ)−C(e(β ,θ)) = (β t− r)(β t+ r)θ
2
2c
+β tV
K (β ;θ) = V (e(β ,θ);θ) = (β t+ r)
θ 2
c
+V .
We assume that V is large enough thatB(1;θ)> 0 for some r ≥ .5, i.e.,
V >−(t− r)(t+ r) θ
2
2tc
.
This guarantees that (at least) the highest type can make a profitable bid under symmetric information, and
hence also under a separating equilibrium schedule. The differential equation for local optimality becomes
β ′ = r
2(β t+ r) θc
β t
(
2t θ
2
2c +V
) ≡ F(β ,θ),
where F(β ,θ) and Fβ (β ,θ) are continuous for (β ,θ)∈ (0,1]×
[
θ ,θ
]
, and its solution identifies a separating
equilibrium schedule since the conditions for quasi-concavity are satisfied,
∂ 2B(β ;θ)
∂β∂θ
= 2β t2
θ
c
≥ 0
∂ 2K (β ;θ)
∂β∂θ
= 2t
θ
c
≥ 0,
with the cut-off type pinned down by the requisite zero-profit condition.
Example 2: Marginal return to effort constant across bidder types. Assume
V (e;θ) = θ + e
C(e) =
c
2
e2.
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Fixing r = r, the bidder maximizes β t (θ + e)− c2 e2+ r (θ + e)− rP. Her optimal effort is given by
e(β ,θ) =
β t+ r
c
(which in this example is independent of θ ). Thus,
B(β ;θ) = β tV (e(β ,θ);θ)−C(e(β ,θ)) = β tθ − r
2−β 2t2
2c
K (β ;θ) = V (e(β ,θ);θ) = θ +
β t+ r
c
.
We assume thatB(1;θ)> 0 for some r ≥ .5, i.e.,
θ >
r2− t2
2tc
.
This guarantees the existence of types that make a positive profit under symmetric information, and hence
also under the separating schedule. The differential equation for local optimality becomes
β ′ =
r
tθ + β t
2
c
≡ F(β ,θ),
where F(β ,θ) and Fβ (β ,θ) are continuous for (β ,θ)∈ (0,1]×
[
θ ,θ
]
, and its solution identifies a separating
equilibrium schedule since the conditions for quasi-concavity are satisfied,
∂ 2B(β ;θ)
∂β∂θ
= t ≥ 0
∂ 2K (β ;θ)
∂β∂θ
= 0≥ 0,
with the cut-off type pinned down by the requisite zero-profit condition. 
51
References
[1] At, Christian, Mike Burkart and Samuel Lee, 2011, “Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening,”
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20(3), 458-476.
[2] Bagnoli, Mark and Barton L. Lipman, 1988, “Successful Takeovers without Exclusion,” Review of
Financial Studies, 1(1), 89-110.
[3] Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Oliver Hart, 2001, “Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate
Control,” CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 3073, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 4.
[4] Becht, Marco, Julian R. Franks, Jeremy Grant, and Hannes F. Wagner, 2014, “The Returns to Hedge
Fund Activism: An International Study,” European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance
Working Paper No. 402/2014.
[5] Berkovitch, Elazar and M. P. Narayanan, 1990, “Competition and the Medium of Exchange,” Review
of Financial Studies, 3(2), 153-174.
[6] Betton, Sandra, B. Espen Eckbo, and Karin S. Thorburn, 2008, “Corporate Takeovers,” in B.E. Eckbo
(ed.) Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Vol. 2, Elsevier/North-Holland,
Ch. 15, 289-427.
[7] Bhattacharya, Sugato, 1990, “The Analytics of Takeover Bidding: Initial Bids and their Premia,”
mimeo.
[8] Bharadwaj, A., Shivdasani, A., 2003, “Valuation effects of bank financing in acquisitions,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 67, 113–148.
[9] Bradley, Michael, Alon Brav, Italy Goldstein, and Wei Jiang, 2010, “Activist arbitrage: A study of
open-ending attempts of closed-end funds,” Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 1-19.
[10] Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas, 2008, “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Performance,” Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1729-1775.
[11] Brav, Alon and Richmond D. Matthews, 2011, “Empty Voting and the Efficiency of Corporate Gover-
nance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 99(2), 289-307.
[12] Brusco, Sandro, Guiseppe Lopomo, David T. Robinson and S. Viswanhatan, 2007, “Efficient Mecha-
nisms for Mergers and Acquisitions,” International Economic Review, 48 (3), 995-1035.
[13] Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi, 1998, “Why Takeover Premia Protect Minority
Shareholders,” Journal of Political Economy, 106(1), 172-204.
52
[14] Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi, 2006, “Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia,”
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 162(1), 32-49.
[15] Chakraborty, Archishman and Bilge Yilmaz, 2011, “Adverse Selection and Convertible Bonds,” Re-
view of Economic Studies, 78(1), 148-175.
[16] Chowdhry, Bhagwan and Narasimhan Jegadeesh, 1994, “Pre-Tender Offer Share Acquisition Strategy
in Takeovers,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29(1), 117-129.
[17] Chowdhry, Bhagwan and Vikram Nanda, 1993, “The Strategic Role of Debt in Takeover Contests,”
Journal of Finance, 48(2), 731-745.
[18] Christofferson, Susan E.K., Christopher C. Geczy, David K. Musto, and Adam V. Reed, 2007, “Vote
Trading and. Information Aggregation,” Journal of Finance 62, 2897-2929.
[19] Davidoff, Steven M., 2013, “With Fewer Barbarians at the Gate, Companies Face a New Pressure,”
New York Times, July 30, 2013.
[20] Dekel, Eddie and Asher Wolinsky, 2012, Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control, Review
of Economic Studies, 79, 196–226.
[21] De La Merced, Michael J., David Gelles, and Rachel Abrams, 2014, “Seeking the Right Chemistry,
Drug Makers Hunt for Mergers,” New York Times, April 22, 2014.
[22] Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel, 1983, “Voting in Corporate Law,” Journal of Law and
Economics, 26, 395-428.
[23] Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel, 1991, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard
University Press.
[24] Eckbo, Espen, 2009, “Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review,” Journal of Corporate
Finance, 15(1), 149–178.
[25] Eckbo, B. Espen, Ronald M. Giammarino and Robert L. Heinkel, 1990, “Asymmetric Information and
the Medium of Exchange in Takeover: Theory and Tests,” Review of Financial Studies, 3(4), 651-675.
[26] Ferreira, Daniel, Emanuel Ornelas and John L. Turner, 2007, “Unbundling Ownership and Control,”
ECGI Working Paper 172/2007.
[27] Finnerty, John D. and An Yan, 2009, “Convertible Securities in Merger Transactions,” Fordham Uni-
versity.
[28] Fishman, Michael J., 1988, “A Theory of Pre-emptive Takeover Bidding,” Rand Journal of Economics,
19(1), 88–101.
53
[29] Fishman, Michael J., 1989, “Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisi-
tions,” Journal of Finance, 44(1), 41-57.
[30] Fos, Vyacheslav, 2013, “The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests,” University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
[31] Greenwood, R. and M. Schor, 2009, ‘Hedge fund investor activism and takeovers’. Journal of Financial
Economics 92(3), 362–375.
[32] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart, 1980, “Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory
of the Corporation,” Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1), 42-64.
[33] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart, 1981, “The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations
of Asymmetric Information”, Journal of Finance 36(2), 253-270.
[34] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart, 1988, “One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate
Control”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 175–202.
[35] Hansen, Robert G., 1987, “A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and Acquisi-
tions,” Journal of Business, 60(1), 75-95.
[36] Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1988, “Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules”, Journal
of Financial Economics, 20, 203–235.
[37] Hirshleifer, David and Sheridan Titman, 1990, “Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile
Takeover Bids,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 295-324.
[38] Holmström, Bengt and Barry Nalebuff, 1992, “To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of
the Free Rider Problem,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1(1), 37-62.
[39] Hu, Henry T.C. and Bernard Black, 2006, “The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Mor-
phable) Ownership,” Southern California Law Review, 79(4), 811-908.
[40] Hu, Henry T.C. and Bernard Black, 2008, “Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Impor-
tance and Extensions,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 156, 625-739.
[41] Innes, Robert, 1990, “Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting With Ex-Ante Action Choices,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 52, 45-68.
[42] Jensen, Michael C., 1986, “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers,” American
Economic Review, 76 (2), 323–329.
[43] Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling, William H., 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
54
[44] Judd, Kenneth L., 1985, “The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables,” Journal
of Eonomic Theory, 35(1), 19-25.
[45] Kalay, Avner and Shagun Pant, 2009, “Time Varying Control Rights and the Private Benefits of Con-
trol,” Working Paper.
[46] Lang, Larry H. P., Rene´ M. Stulz, and Ralph A. Walkling, 1991, “A Test of the Free Cash Flow
Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder Returns,” Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 315–335.
[47] Leland, Hayne E. and David H. Pyle, 1977, “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and
Financial Intermediation,” Journal of Finance, 32 (2), 371-387.
[48] Liu, Tingjun, 2008, “Takeover Bidding with Signaling Incentives,” Carey School of Business, Arizona
State University.
[49] Maloney, Michael T., Robert E. McCormick, and Mark L. Mitchell, 1993, “Managerial Decision Mak-
ing and Capital Structure,” Journal of Business, 66, 189–217.
[50] Marquez, Robert and Bilge Yilmaz, 2008, “Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers,” Economet-
rica, 76(5), 1075-1101.
[51] Marquez, Robert and Bilge Yilmaz, 2012, “Takeover Bidding and Shareholder Information,” Review
of Corporate Finance Studies, 1(1), 1-27.
[52] Martin, Kenneth J., 1996, “The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment Opportuni-
ties, and Management Ownership,” Journal of Finance, 51(4), 1227-1246.
[53] Martynova, Marina and Luc Renneboog, 2009, “What determines the financing decision in corporate
takeovers: Cost of capital, agency problems, or the means of payment?,” Journal of Corporate Finance,
15, 290–315.
[54] Müller, Holger and Fausto Panunzi, 2004, “Tender Offers and Leverage,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 119(4), 1217-1248.
[55] Myers, Stewart and Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when
Firms have Information that Investors do not have,” Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221.
[56] Nachman, David C. and Thomas H. Noe, 1994, “Optimal Design of Securities Under Asymmetric
Information,” Review of Financial Studies, 7(1), 1-44.
[57] Neeman, Zvika and Gerhard O. Orosel, 2006, “On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have
common interests,” International Review of Law and Economics, 26, 536–556.
[58] Osano, Hiroshi, 2009, “Acquisition Mode and Financing in Takeovers,” Kyoto University.
55
[59] Schlingemann, Frederik P., 2004, “Financing decisions and bidder gains,” Journal of Corporate Fi-
nance, 10, 683– 701.
[60] Sharara, Norma M. and Anne E. Hoke-Witherspoon, 1993, “The Evolution of the 1992 Shareholder
Communication Proxy Rules and Their Impact on Corporate Governance,” The Business Lawyer,
49(1), 327–358.
[61] Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, 1986, “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,” Journal of
Political Economy, 94(3, Part 1), 461-488.
[62] Sydsaeter, Knut, Peter Hammond, Atle Seierstad, and Arne Strom, 2008, Further Mathematics for
Economic Analysis, 2nd edition, Prentice Hall.
56
